

Person: Bueltmann, Stephen (bueltman@jlab.org)
Org: PHALLB

Status: PROCESSED
Saved: 1/31/2020 1:58:33 PM
Submitted: 1/31/2020 1:58:33 PM



Operational Safety Procedure Review and Approval Form # 97733
(See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3310 Appendix T1 Operational Safety Procedure \(OSP\) and Temporary OSP Procedure](#) for Instructions)

Type:	OSP Click for OSP/TOSP Procedure Form Click for LOSP Procedure Form Click for LTT-Individual Information Click for LTT-Group Information	
Serial Number:	ENP-20-97733-OSP	
Issue Date:	2/3/2020	
Expiration Date:	1/3/2021	
Title:	BONuS12 Radial Time Projection Chamber (RTPC) System	
Location: (where work is being performed) Building Floor Plans	94 - Experimental Hall B Location Detail: (specifies about where in the selected location(s) the work is being performed)	
Risk Classification: (See ES&H Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T3 Risk Code Assignment)	Without mitigation measures (3 or 4): I With mitigation measures in place (N, 1, or 2): N	
Reason:	This document is written to mitigate hazard issues that are : Not Applicable	
Owning Organization:	PHALLB	
Document Owner(s):	Stepanyan, Stepan (stepanya@jlab.org) Primary Bueltmann, Stephen (bueltman@jlab.org) Poudel, Jiwan (jpoudel@jlab.org)	
Supplemental Technical Validations <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
50V or Greater: De-energized Work (Bill Rainey, Tim Fitzgerald) Gas Cylinders (Robert Myles, Tim Minga) ODH 0 and 1 (Imani Burton, Jennifer Williams) Storage & Handling of Radioactive Materials (David Hamlette, Keith Welch) ESH&Q Liasion (Bert Manzlak)		
Document History <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Revision	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reason for revision or update	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Serial number of superseded document
Lessons Learned	Lessons Learned relating to the hazard issues noted above have been reviewed.	

Comments for reviewers/approvers:

Issued concerning ESAD (electrical) have been addressed and a new ESAD uploaded.

Attachments

Procedure: *3310T1Form.pdf*

THA: *3210T1FormBonus.pdf*

Additional Files: *ESAD_HallB-CLAS12_rgF.pdf*

Review Signatures

Subject Matter Expert : Electricity->50V or Greater:
De-energized Work

Signed on 1/31/2020 1:59:54 PM by Tim Fitzgerald (tfitzger@jlab.org)

Subject Matter Expert : Gas Cylinders

Signed on 1/31/2020 2:56:16 PM by Tim Minga (minga@jlab.org)

Subject Matter Expert : Oxygen Deficiency Hazards (ODH)->ODH 0 and 1

Signed on 1/31/2020 4:15:52 PM by Jennifer Williams (jennifer@jlab.org)

Subject Matter Expert : Radiation - Ionizing->Storage & Handling of Radioactive Materials

Signed on 1/31/2020 3:07:55 PM by Keith Welch (welch@jlab.org)

Approval Signatures

Division Safety Officer : PHALLB

Signed on 2/3/2020 7:49:36 AM by Ed Folts (folts@jlab.org)

ESH&Q Division Liasion : PHALLB

Signed on 2/3/2020 8:44:52 AM by Bert Manzlak (manzlak@jlab.org)

Org Manager : PHALLB

Signed on 2/3/2020 4:31:43 PM by Marco Battaglieri (battagli@jlab.org)

Safety Warden : Experimental Hall B

Signed on 2/3/2020 6:33:24 AM by Calvin Mealer (mealer@jlab.org)

Operational Safety Procedure Form

(See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3310 Appendix T1](#)
Operational Safety Procedure (OSP) and Temporary OSP
Procedure for instructions.)

Click
For Word Doc

Title:	BONuS12 Radial Time Projection Chamber (RTPC) System		
Location:	Hall B	Type:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OSP <input type="checkbox"/> TOSP
Risk Classification (per Task Hazard Analysis attached) (See ESH&O Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T3 Risk Code Assignment.)		Highest Risk Code Before Mitigation	1
		Highest Risk Code after Mitigation (N, 1, or 2):	N
Owning Organization:	JLab – Hall B	Date:	01/29/2020
Document Owner(s):	S. Bueltmann, J. Poudel		

DEFINE THE SCOPE OF WORK

1. Purpose of the Procedure – Describe in detail the reason for the procedure (what is being done and why).

The RTPC detector is designed and constructed by the BONuS12 experimental group to track the recoil proton from the deuterium target to study the structure function of neutron. 40 cm long RTPC detector is a cylindrical gaseous detector made up of three layer of GEMs with radius 8 cm whose longitudinal axis is along beamline. This detector surrounds the pressurized deuterium target of 6mm radius and 40 cm long symmetrically. He+CO2 mixture (80% +20%) used as drift gas in the detector. This detector has 17,280 pads for data readout and the data acquisition is performed by the DREAM-based electronics.

2. Scope – include all operations, people, and/or areas that the procedure will affect.

The operation of RTPC detector includes: (details is found at https://wiki.jlab.org/elas12-run/images/f/fe/RTPC_Operations_Manual.pdf)

1. Operation of low of Readout electronics and high voltage systems of RTPC:
The following must be done for the operation and maintenance of RTPC
 - Turn on/off the voltage systems from EPICS Interface
 - Proper connection of the voltage leads
 - Follow safety procedure
2. Operation of Gas system:
For the operation and maintenance of the gas system, follow ESAD and turn off voltage system. In addition, ensure the gas exchange in the detector before turning the voltage back on. The gas used in the detector is not flammable (He and He-CO2).
3. Use of radioactive source: Two Strontium-90 source of 2 microcurie installed inside a Drift monitoring system (DMS) box and the box is enclosed by RadCon. Individuals handling the radioactive sources must be RW-1 trained, been briefed on and signed the Sealed Source User agreement, and follow the prescribed source handling guidance. Inform RadCon before taking out /transferring the sources.

These operations are limited to trained RTPC maintenance personnel only which include:
Stephen Bueltmann, Sebastian Kuhn, Gail Dodge, Mohammad Hattawy, Nathan Dzbenski, David Payette, Jiwan Poudel, Eric Christy

3. Description of the Facility – include building, floor plans and layout of the experiment or operation.

The RTPC detector is a part of central detector, which sits in Hall B Central Carriage. So the RTPC goes inside Solenoidal magnet surrounding the target symmetrically along beam line.

ANALYZE THE HAZARDS and IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

4. Hazards identified on written Task Hazard Analysis

Electrical shock (HV and LV), non-flammable gas mixture (He and He-CO₂), Radio-active source

5. Authority and Responsibility:

5.1 Who has authority to implement/terminate

Stephen Bueltmann, Sebastian Kuhn, Stepan Stepanyan

5.2 Who is responsible for key tasks

Stephen Bueltmann, Sebastian Kuhn and authorized RTPC experts

5.3 Who analyzes the special or unusual hazards including elevated work, chemicals, gases, fire or sparks (See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T1 Work Planning, Control, and Authorization Procedure](#))

Ed Folts

6. Personal and Environmental Hazard Controls Including:

6.1 Shielding

N/A

6.2 Barriers (magnetic, hearing, elevated or crane work, etc.)

N/A

6.3 Interlocks

Manual and software interlock for voltage and gas system

6.4 Monitoring systems

EPICS monitoring for Weiner HV supply and CAEN software for DMS supply. EPICS interface for monitoring gas from Counting house, and Labview from Gas Shed

6.5 Ventilation

Existing Hall B ventilations (gas hoses)

6.6 Other (Electrical, ODH, Trip, Ladder) (Attach related Temporary Work Permits or Safety Reviews as appropriate.)

For servicing: fall protection training, ladder training, manlift training, harness training,

7. List of Safety Equipment:

7.1 List of Safety Equipment:

Gloves and the safety glasses are used as needed.

7.2 Special Tools:

N/A

8. Associated Administrative Controls

Appropriate signalization for voltage and gas system.

9. Training

9.1 What are the Training Requirements (See [List of Training Skills](#))

SAF111
 EH&S orientation
 Electrical safety Guidelines
 Pressure and Vacuum systems Hazard awareness
 GERT & RadWorker-I

DEVELOP THE PROCEDURE

10. Operating Guidelines

As directed in the 'RTPC Operations Manual' (see https://wiki.jlab.org/clas12-run/images/f/fe/RTPC_Operations_Manual.pdf)

11. Notification of Affected Personnel (who, how, and when include building manager, safety warden, and area coordinator)

The Hall B Work Coordinator should be consulted before any RTPC servicing work on the detector hardware. Routine signal checkout, DMS system and DREAM electronics work should be done only by RTPC experts. To open DMS, RadCon should be contacted.

12. List the Steps Required to Execute the Procedure: from start to finish.

As described in the 'RTPC Operations Manual' (see https://wiki.jlab.org/clas12-run/images/f/fe/RTPC_Operations_Manual.pdf)

13. Back Out Procedure(s) i.e. steps necessary to restore the equipment/area to a safe level.

1. End the run
2. Turn off Voltages
3. Turn off Gas system
4. Turn off DAQ system electronics

14. Special environmental control requirements:

14.1 List materials, chemicals, gasses that could impact the environment (ensure these are considered when choosing Subject Mater Experts) and explore [EMP-04 Project/Activity/Experiment Environmental Review](#) below

None

14.2 Environmental impacts (See [EMP-04 Project/Activity/Experiment Environmental Review](#))

None

14.3 Abatement steps (secondary containment or special packaging requirements)

None

15. Unusual/Emergency Procedures (e.g., loss of power, spills, fire, etc.)

Contact
 Stephen Bueltmann, phone: 757-232-5368

Sebastian Kuhn, phone: 757-639-6640

16. Instrument Calibration Requirements (e.g., safety system/device recertification, RF probe calibration)

None

17. Inspection Schedules

None

18. References/Associated/Relevant Documentation

Operation and Safety manual, ESAD, ODH, RTPC Operation Manual, ES&H manual

19. List of Records Generated (Include Location / Review and Approved procedure)

Submit Procedure for Review and Approval (See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3310 Appendix T1 OSP & TOSP Instructions – Section 4.2 Submit Draft Procedure for Initial Review](#)):

- Convert this document to .pdf
- Open electronic cover sheet:
https://mis.jlab.org/mis/apps/mis_forms/operational_safety_procedure_form.cfm
- Complete the form
- Upload the pdf document and associated Task Hazard Analysis (also in .pdf format)

Distribution: Copies to Affected Area, Authors, Division Safety Officer

Expiration: Forward to ESH&Q Document Control

Form Revision Summary

Revision 1.5 – 04/11/18 – Training section moved from section 5 Authority and Responsibility to section 9 Training

Revision 1.4 – 06/20/16 – Repositioned “Scope of Work” to clarify processes

Qualifying Periodic Review – 02/19/14 – No substantive changes required

Revision 1.3 – 11/27/13 – Added “Owning Organization” to more accurately reflect laboratory operations.

Revision 1.2 – 09/15/12 – Update form to conform to electronic review.

Revision 1.1 – 04/03/12 – Risk Code 0 switched to N to be consistent with [3210 T3 Risk Code Assignment](#).

Revision 1.0 – 12/01/11 – Added reasoning for OSP to aid in appropriate review determination.

Revision 0.0 – 10/05/09 – Updated to reflect current laboratory operations

ISSUING AUTHORITY	FORM TECHNICAL POINT-OF-CONTACT	APPROVAL DATE	REVIEW DATE	REV.
ESH&Q Division	Harry Fanning	04/11/18	04/11/21	1.5

This document is controlled as an on line file. It may be printed but the print copy is not a controlled document. It is the user’s responsibility to ensure that the document is the same revision as the current on line file. This copy was printed on 1/29/2020.

Task Hazard Analysis (THA) Worksheet

(See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T1](#)
[Work Planning, Control, and Authorization Procedure](#))

Click
For Word

Author:	S. Bueltmann, J. Poudel	Date:	1/29/2020	Task #: If applicable	
Complete all information. Use as many sheets as necessary					
Task Title:	Bonus12 Radial Time Projection Chamber (RTPC) system	Task Location:	Hall B		
Division:	Physics	Department:	Hall B	Frequency of use:	Continuously
Lead Worker:	J. Poudel				
Mitigation already in place: Standard Protecting Measures Work Control Documents	ES&H Manual (Pressure and Vacuum systems Hazard awareness, General Electrical Safety Guidelines), ODH training, GERT and RadWorker 1 training, Hall B safety training				

Sequence of Task Steps	Task Steps/Potential Hazards	Consequence Level	Probability Level	Risk Code (before mitigation)	Proposed Mitigation (Required for Risk Code >2)	Safety Procedures/ Practices/Controls/Training	Risk Code (after mitigation)
1/4	Turn on gas supply (non-flammable gas)	EL	L	N		Operational manual	N
2/4	Turn on low voltage	EL	L	N		Operational manual	N
3/4	Turn on high voltage	L	L	1		Covered HV connections, use of gloves; operational procedures manual	N
4/4	Install radioactive Sr-90 source	L	L	1		Pre-installed inside a closed box, Radiation worker training (RadWorker 1)	N

Highest Risk Code before Mitigation:	1	Highest Risk Code after Mitigation:	N
---	---	--	---

Task Hazard Analysis (THA) Worksheet

(See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T1](#)
[Work Planning, Control, and Authorization Procedure](#))

When completed, if the analysis indicates that the [Risk Code](#) before mitigation for any steps is “medium” or higher (RC≥3), then a formal [Work Control Document](#) (WCD) is developed for the task. Attach this completed Task Hazard Analysis Worksheet. Have the package reviewed and approved prior to beginning work. (See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3310 Operational Safety Procedure Program](#).)

For questions or comments regarding this form contact the Technical Point-of-Contact [Harry Fanning](#)

This document is controlled as an on line file. It may be printed but the print copy is not a controlled document. It is the user's responsibility to ensure that the document is the same revision as the current on line file. This copy was printed on 1/29/2020.

Task Hazard Analysis (THA) Worksheet

(See [ES&H Manual Chapter 3210 Appendix T1](#)
Work Planning, Control, and Authorization Procedure)

Form Revision Summary

Periodic Review – 08/29/18 – No changes per TPOC

Periodic Review – 08/13/15 – No changes per TPOC

Revision 0.1 – 06/19/12 - Triennial Review. Update to format.

Revision 0.0 – 10/05/09 – Written to document current laboratory operational procedure.

ISSUING AUTHORITY	TECHNICAL POINT-OF-CONTACT	APPROVAL DATE	REVIEW DATE	REV.
ESH&Q Division	Harry Fanning	08/29/18	08/29/21	0.1

This document is controlled as an on line file. It may be printed but the print copy is not a controlled document. It is the user's responsibility to ensure that the document is the same revision as the current on line file. This copy was printed on 1/29/2020.

Experiment Safety Assessment Document (ESAD)
for the Hall B CLAS12 Run Group F

January 31, 2020
v2.0

Contents

1	Introduction	5
2	General Hazards	6
2.1	Radiation	6
2.2	Fire	7
2.3	Electrical Systems	7
2.4	Mechanical Systems	7
2.5	Strong Magnetic Fields	8
2.6	Cryogenic Fluids and Oxygen Deficiency Hazard	8
2.7	Vacuum and Pressure Vessels	8
2.8	Hazardous Materials	9
2.9	Lasers	9
3	Hall B-Specific Equipment	10
3.1	Overview	10
3.2	Detector Checkout System	10
3.3	Beamline	11
3.3.1	Hazards	11
3.3.2	Mitigations	11
3.3.3	Responsible Personnel	12
3.4	Vacuum System	13
3.4.1	Hazards	13
3.4.2	Mitigations	13
3.4.3	Responsible Personnel	13
3.5	Target System	13
3.5.1	Hazards	14
3.5.2	Mitigations	14
3.5.3	Responsible Personnel	15

3.6	Hall B Gas System	16
3.6.1	Hazards	17
3.6.2	Mitigations	18
3.6.3	Responsible Personnel	20
3.7	DAQ and Trigger	20
3.7.1	Hazards	21
3.7.2	Mitigations	21
3.7.3	Responsible Personnel	21
3.8	High Threshold Cherenkov Counter	22
3.8.1	Hazards	22
3.8.2	Mitigations	22
3.8.3	Responsible Personnel	23
3.9	Drift Chambers	23
3.9.1	Hazards	23
3.9.2	Mitigations	24
3.9.3	Responsible Personnel	25
3.10	Low Threshold Cherenkov Counter	25
3.10.1	Hazards	25
3.10.2	Mitigations	25
3.10.3	Responsible Personnel	26
3.11	Forward Time-of-Flight System	26
3.11.1	Hazards	26
3.11.2	Mitigations	27
3.11.3	Responsible Personnel	27
3.12	Electromagnetic Calorimeter	28
3.12.1	Hazards	28
3.12.2	Mitigations	28
3.12.3	Responsible Personnel	29
3.13	Central Time-of-Flight System	29
3.13.1	Hazards	29
3.13.2	Mitigations	30
3.13.3	Responsible Personnel	31
3.14	Silicon Tracker	32
3.15	Radial Time Projection Chamber	32
3.15.1	Overview	32
3.15.2	RTPC Construction	32
3.15.2.1	Hazards	33
3.15.2.2	Mitigations	33
3.15.3	Drift Monitoring System	34
3.15.3.1	Hazards	35

3.15.3.2	Mitigations	35
3.15.4	Responsible Personnel	36
3.16	Central Neutron Detector	37
3.16.1	Hazards	38
3.16.1.1	Electrical Hazard	38
3.16.1.2	Magnetic Field Hazard	38
3.16.2	Mitigations	38
3.16.2.1	Electrical Hazard Mitigations	38
3.16.2.2	Magnetic Field Hazard Mitigations	38
3.16.3	Responsible Personnel	38
3.17	Micromegas Vertex Tracker	38
3.17.1	Hazards	40
3.17.2	Mitigations	40
3.17.3	Responsible Personnel	42
3.18	Ring Imaging Cherenkov Counter	42
3.18.1	Hazards	43
3.18.2	Mitigations	44
3.18.3	Responsible Personnel	45
3.19	Forward Tagger System	45
3.19.1	Forward Tagger Calorimeter	46
3.19.1.1	Hazards	46
3.19.1.2	Mitigations	47
3.19.1.3	Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Personnel)	47
3.19.1.4	Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Equipment)	48
3.19.1.5	Other Hazards Mitigation	48
3.19.1.6	Responsible Personnel	50
3.19.2	Forward Tagger Hodoscope	50
3.19.2.1	Hazards	50
3.19.2.2	Mitigations	51
3.19.2.3	Responsible Personnel	51
3.19.3	Forward Tagger Tracker	52
3.19.4	Hazards	52
3.19.5	Mitigations	53
3.19.5.1	Fire Hazards Mitigation (Equipment and Personnel)	53
3.19.5.2	Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Personnel)	53
3.19.5.3	Other Hazards Mitigation	54
3.19.5.4	Responsible Personnel	54
3.20	Backward Angle Neutron Detector	55
3.20.1	Hazards	55

3.20.1.1	Electrical hazard	55
3.20.1.2	Magnetic field hazard	56
3.20.2	Mitigations	56
3.20.2.1	Electrical hazard mitigations	56
3.20.2.2	Magnetic field hazard mitigations	56
3.20.3	Responsible personnel	56
3.21	Superconducting Solenoid Magnet	56
3.21.1	Hazards	57
3.21.2	Mitigations	57
3.21.2.1	Electrical Hazard	57
3.21.2.2	Cryogenic Hazard	57
3.21.2.3	Vacuum Hazard	58
3.21.2.4	Magnetic Field	58
3.21.2.5	Stored Energy	58
3.21.3	Responsible Personnel	59
3.22	Superconducting Toroidal Magnet	59
3.22.1	Hazards	59
3.22.2	Mitigations	59
3.22.2.1	Electrical Hazard	59
3.22.2.2	Cryogenic Hazard	60
3.22.2.3	Vacuum Hazard	60
3.22.2.4	Magnetic Field	60
3.22.2.5	Stored Energy	61
3.22.3	Responsible Personnel	61

Chapter 1

Introduction

This ESAD document describes the identified hazards of the experiment and the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate them. This document is part of the CEBAF experiment review process as defined in Chapter 3120 of the Jefferson Lab EHS&Q manual, and will start by describing general types of hazards that might be present in any of the JLab experimental halls. The document then addresses the hazards associated with subsystems of the equipment in Experimental Hall B and their mitigation. Responsible personnel for each item are also noted. In case of life threatening emergencies call 911 and then notify the guard house at x5822 so that the guards can help the responders. This document does not attempt to describe the function or operation of the various subsystems. Such information can be found in the individual subsystem Operations Manuals.

Chapter 2

General Hazards

2.1 Radiation

CEBAF's high intensity and high energy electron beam is a potentially lethal direct radiation source. It can also create radioactive materials that are hazardous even after the beam has been turned off. There are many redundant measures aimed at preventing accidental exposure to personnel by the beam or exposure to beam-associated radiation sources that are in place at JLab. The training and mitigation procedures are handled through the JLab Radiation Control Department (RadCon). RadCon can be contacted as follows: For routine support and surveys, or for emergencies after-hours, call the RadCon cell phone at 876-1743. For escalation of effort or for emergencies, the RadCon manager (Keith Welch) can be reached as follows: Office: 269-7212.

Radiation damage to materials and electronics is mainly determined by the neutron dose (photon dose typically causes parity errors and is easier to shield against). Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) electronics is typically robust up to neutron doses of about 10^{13} n/cm². If the experimental equipment dose as calculated in the RSAD is beyond this damage threshold, the experiment needs to add an appendix on "Evaluation of potential radiation damage" in the experiment-specific ESAD. There, the radiation damage dose, potential impact to equipment located in areas above this damage threshold, as well as the mitigating measures to be taken should be described.

2.2 Fire

Each of the experimental halls contains numerous combustible materials and flammable gases. In addition, they contain potential ignition sources, such as electrical wiring and equipment. General fire hazards and procedures for dealing with these are covered by JLab emergency management procedures. The JLab fire marshal (Tim Minga) can be contacted 269-7310.

2.3 Electrical Systems

Hazards associated with electrical systems are the most common risk in the experimental halls. Almost every subsystem requires AC and/or DC power. Due to the high current and/or high voltage requirements of many of these subsystems, they and their power supplies are potentially lethal electrical sources. In the case of superconducting magnets the stored energy is so large that an uncontrolled electrical discharge can be lethal for a period of time even after the actual power source has been turned off. Anyone working on electrical power in the experimental halls must comply with Chapter 6200 of the Jefferson Lab EHS&Q manual and must obtain approval of one of the responsible personnel. The JLab electrical safety point-of-contact (Tim Fitzgerald) can be reached at 269-7006.

2.4 Mechanical Systems

There exist a variety of mechanical hazards in all experimental halls at JLab. Numerous electro-mechanical subsystems are massive enough to produce potential fall and/or crush hazards. In addition, heavy objects are routinely moved around within the experimental halls during reconfigurations for specific experiments.

Use of ladders and scaffolding must comply with Chapter 6132 of the Jefferson Lab EHS&Q manual. Use of cranes, hoists, lifts, etc. must comply with Chapter 6141 of the Jefferson Lab EHS&Q manual. Use of personal protective equipment to mitigate mechanical hazards, such as hard hats, safety harnesses, gloves, and safety shoes, are mandatory when deemed necessary. The JLab technical point-of-contact (Suresh Chandra) can be contacted at 269-7248.

2.5 Strong Magnetic Fields

Powerful magnets exist in all JLab experimental halls. Metal objects may be attracted by the magnet fringe field and become airborne, possibly injuring body parts or striking fragile components, resulting in a cascading hazard condition. Cardiac pacemakers or other electronic medical devices may no longer function properly in the presence of magnetic fields. Metallic medical implants (non-electronic) may be adversely affected by magnetic fields. Loss of information from magnetic data storage devices such as tapes, disks, and credit cards may also occur. Contact Jennifer Williams at 269-7882, in case of questions or concerns.

2.6 Cryogenic Fluids and Oxygen Deficiency Hazard

Cryogenic fluids and gases are commonly used in the experimental halls at JLab. When released in an uncontrolled manner these can result in explosion, fire, cryogenic burns, and the displacement of air, resulting in an oxygen deficiency hazard (ODH) condition. The hazard level and associated mitigation are dependent on the subsystem and cryogenic fluid. However, they are mostly associated with cryogenic superconducting magnets and cryogenic target systems. Flammable cryogenic gases used in the experimental halls include hydrogen and deuterium, which are colorless, odorless gases and, hence, not easily detected by human senses. Hydrogen air mixtures are flammable over a large range of relative concentrations from 4% to 75% H₂ by volume. Non-flammable cryogenic gases typically used include He and nitrogen. Contact Jerry Kowal at 269-7275 in case of questions or concerns.

2.7 Vacuum and Pressure Vessels

Vacuum and/or pressure vessels are commonly used in the experimental halls. Many of these have thin aluminum or Kevlar/Mylar windows that are close to the entrance and/or exit of the vessels or beampipes. These windows burst if punctured accidentally or can fail if significant over-pressure were to exist. Injury is possible if a failure were to occur near an individual. All work on vacuum windows in the experimental halls must occur under the supervision of appropriately trained JLab personnel. Specifically, the scattering chamber and beamline exit windows must always be leak checked

before service. Contact Will Oren 269-7344 for vacuum and pressure vessel issues.

2.8 Hazardous Materials

Hazardous materials in the form of solids, liquids, and gases that may harm people or property exist in the JLab experimental halls. The most common of these materials include lead, beryllium compounds, and various toxic and corrosive chemicals. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for hazardous materials in use in the experimental hall are available from the hall Safety Wardens. These are being replaced by the new standard Safety Data Sheets (SDS) as they become available in compliance with the new OSHA standards. Handling of these materials must follow the guidelines of the EHS&Q manual. Machining of lead or beryllium, which are highly toxic in powdered form, requires prior approval of the EHS&Q staff. Lead Worker training is required in order to handle lead in the experiment halls. In case of questions or concerns, the JLab hazardous materials specialist (Scott Conely) can be contacted at 269-7308, cell: (757) 814-6472.

2.9 Lasers

High power lasers are often used in the experimental areas for various purposes. Improperly used lasers are potentially dangerous. Exposure to laser beams at sufficient power levels may cause thermal and photochemical injury to the eye, resulting in retina burns and blindness. Skin exposure to laser beams may induce pigmentation, accelerated aging, or severe skin burns. Laser beams may also ignite combustible materials creating a fire hazard. At JLab, lasers with power higher than 5 mW (Class 3B) can only be operated in a controlled environment with proper eye protection and engineering controls designed and approved for the specific laser system. Each specific laser system shall be operated under the supervision of a Laser System Supervisor (LSS) following the Laser Operating Safety Procedure (LOSP) for that system approved by the Laboratory Laser Safety Officer (LSO). The LSO (Paul Collins) can be reached at 269-7556.

Chapter 3

Hall B-Specific Equipment

3.1 Overview

The Hall B subsystems included in this chapter are considered part of the End-station Experimental Equipment for the CLAS12 RG F Run. Many of these subsystems impose similar hazards, such as those induced by magnets and magnet power supplies, high voltage systems, cryogenic systems, and vacuum systems. Note that a specific subsystem may have many unique hazards associated with it. For each major system, the hazards, mitigations, and responsible personnel are noted.

The material in this chapter is a subset of the material in the Hall B subsystem Operations Manuals and is only intended to familiarize people with the hazards and responsible personnel for these systems. In no way should it be taken as sufficient information to use or operate this equipment.

3.2 Detector Checkout System

The Hall B equipment readiness for the beam run will be checked using the CEBAF Hot Checkout system (HCO) [1]. Each detector system has its own subsystems and items that have to be checked and signed off by the appropriate groups. The systems that have been checked and signed as ready for beam will be indicated by a green “thumbs up”. Subsystems that are still waiting for readiness check-up and approval will be indicated with red crosses.

In order to make sure that hall equipment that should be tied into the machine Fast Shutdown (FSD) system has been properly checked, the hall Work Coordinator must be notified by e-mail prior to the end of each instal-

lation period by the system owner that the checks have been performed in conjunction with accelerator operations (i.e. checking that the equipment's signals will in fact cause an FSD). These notifications will be noted in the Work Coordinator's final checklist as having been done. System owners are responsible for notifying the Work Coordinator that their system has an FSD tie-in so it can be added to the checklist.

The hall will get permission to run beam only after all systems tied to the delivery of the beam to the designated destination are signed off. At that point the main Hall B system will indicate "Ready" in the HCO tree.

3.3 Beamline

The control and measurement equipment along the Hall B beamline consists of various elements necessary to transport the beam with the required specifications onto the production target and the beam dump, and simultaneously to measure the properties of the beam relevant to the successful implementation of the physics program in Hall B.

The beamline in the hall provides the interface between the CEBAF accelerator and the experimental hall. All work on the beamline must be coordinated with both the Physics Division and the Accelerator Division in order to ensure safe and reliable transport of the electron beam to the dump. The Accelerator Division has the primary responsibility of delivering the electron beam to the experimental target and designated dumps.

3.3.1 Hazards

Along the beamline various hazards can be found. These include radiation areas, vacuum windows, high voltage, and magnetic fields.

3.3.2 Mitigations

All magnets (dipoles, quadrupoles, sextupoles, beam correctors) and beam diagnostic devices (BPMs, scanners, beam loss monitors, viewers) necessary to transport and monitor the beam are controlled by the Machine Control Center (MCC) and/or Hall B personnel through EPICS [2]. The detailed operational procedures for the Hall B beamline are essentially the same as those for the CEBAF machine and beamline.

Personnel who need to work near or around the beamline should keep in mind the potential hazards:

- Radiation "Hot Spots" - marked by an ARM or RadCon personnel,

- Vacuum in beamline elements and other vessels,
- Thin-windowed vacuum enclosures (e.g. the scattering chamber),
- Strong magnetic fields,
- Electric power hazards in the vicinity of magnets, and
- Conventional hazards (fall hazard, crane hazard, etc.).

These hazards are noted by signs and the most hazardous areas along the beamline are roped off to restrict access when operational (e.g. around the magnets). Signs are posted by RadCon for any hot spots. Surveys of the beamline and surrounding areas will be performed before any work is done in these areas. The connection of leads to magnets have plastic covers for electrical safety. Any work around the magnets will require de-energizing the magnets. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons. Any work on the magnets requires the “Lock and Tag” procedures [3].

Additional safety information can be obtained from the following documents:

- EHS&Q Manual [3]
- PSS description document [4]
- Accelerator Operations Directive [5]

3.3.3 Responsible Personnel

The beamline requires both Accelerator and Physics Division personnel to maintain and operate. It is very important that both groups stay in contact with each other to coordinate any work on the Hall B beamline.

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757)-303-3996		1st contact
E. Pasyuk	Hall B	x6020	pasyuk@jlab.org	2nd contact
M. Tiefenback	Accel.	x7430	tiefen@jlab.org	Contact to Hall B
M. Mock	Accel.	x5696	mock@jlab.org	Contact to Physics

Table 3.1: Responsible personnel for the Hall B beamline.

3.4 Vacuum System

The Hall B vacuum system during RG F consists of two segments: the beam transport line to the experimental target, consisting of 1.5 in to 2.5 in diameter beampipes, and the vacuum beamline to the Hall B electron dump consisting of 2 in to 6 in diameter beampipes. There are 2 in diameter, 2-mil-thick aluminum windows on the exit of the upstream beamline and the entrance of the vacuum beamline of the downstream segment. The vacuum spaces can be isolated from one another via vacuum valves and the vacuum level can be monitored independently using cold cathode gauges. The vacuum in the system is provided by a set of roughing, turbo, and ion pumps, and is maintained at a level of better than 10^{-5} Torr.

3.4.1 Hazards

Hazards associated with the vacuum system are due to rapid decompression in case of a window failure. Loud noises can cause hearing loss.

3.4.2 Mitigations

All personnel working in the vicinity of the entrance and exit windows are required to wear hearing protection. Warning signs must be posted in that area. In addition, all vacuum vessels and piping are designed as pressure vessels.

3.4.3 Responsible Personnel

The vacuum system will be maintained by the Hall B Engineering Group.

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Engineering on call	Hall B	(757)-748-5048		1st contact
D. Insley	Hall B	x7566	dinsley@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.2: Personnel responsible for the Hall B vacuum system.

3.5 Target System

Run Group F will use a variety of gas targets (hydrogen, deuterium, and helium) at room temperature and at 1 to 6 atm absolute pressure (6 atm = 73.5 psig). The gas will be contained within a thin-walled (50 μm wall

thickness) aluminum-coated polyimide (Kapton) tube (straw), which will be 500 mm long and 6 mm in diameter. The beam entrance and exit windows will be made out of 15 μm thick aluminum foil (2014 alloy). The target will be mounted inside the centre bore of the RTPC. The target beam exit window will protrude 20 mm downstream of the RTPC and will be enshrouded with a 60 cm long polyimide capsule containing inert helium gas at 1 atm. This capsule ends with a 15 μm aluminum foil window inside the Moller shield. The same helium buffer gas will also fill the radial space between the gas target and the inner window of the RTPC. The target gas is supplied at the upstream end via a capillary copper tube from a 3 liter buffer volume, separated by a remote-controlled isolation valve. The gas handling system upstream of the isolation valve complies with ASME B31.3 process piping code.

3.5.1 Hazards

The main hazard is a potential rupture of the target cell or the target entrance and exit windows. If the target is filled with ^4He at the time, the only hazard would be a loud noise and potential damage to the RTPC detector surrounding the target due to a pressure shock. If the target is filled with ^1H or ^2H , an additional hazard will be the presence of these flammable gases within the RTPC environment. The total gas volumes involved are too small to create a ODH risk.

3.5.2 Mitigations

The design and construction of the gas target is in accordance to ASME B31.3 process piping code, except downstream of the isolation valve. This section includes the target cell and is qualified by equivalent measures. These include limiting the amount of flammable gas in this section and preventing excess flow into this section from the buffer volume in case of a sudden pressure loss due to a rupture of the target cell or its windows. A flame arrester is preventing the ignition of flammable gas upstream of this section (upstream of the isolation valve).

During operation the target tube and the thin entrance and exit windows are surrounded by the Hall B CLAS12 Central Detectors and are therefore difficult to access. The target will only be filled with gas in excess of 1 atm pressure when installed inside the CLAS12 Central Detector.

Two H_2/D_2 gas detectors are installed near the target location, one above the right hand side of the electronics rack and another above the cryostat.

In case of a detected leak, the control system will immediately shut off the supply of gas to the target.

A pressure sensor is mounted downstream of the isolation valve to detect a sudden loss of pressure and immediately shut off the gas supply.

The quantity of flammable gas (H_2 or D_2) downstream of the isolation valve is less than 1000 ft lbs in energy (1355 J). The ratio of energy per volume for hydrogen or deuterium is 14.5 J/cm^3 . This includes chemical heat of combustion (13 J/cm^3) and mechanical explosion energy (1.5 J/cm^3 , Brode equation). For the limit of 1355 J this corresponds to 13.3 cm^3 of deuterium (or hydrogen) gas at 7 atm (93.4 cm^3 at 1 atm).

This volume limit in the section qualified by equivalent measures will be achieved by limiting the volume of the target cell plus the capillary supply tubing up to the isolation valve to 13.3 cm^3 . To limit the amount of gas flow into the target cell, the supply tubing inner diameter will be capillary and an excess flow valve will limit the flow in case of sudden loss of pressure in the target cell due to bursting.

- The area shall be posted “Danger Flammable Gases. No Ignition Sources”,
- Combustibles and ignition sources shall be minimized within 10 ft or 3 m of target’s gas handling equipment and piping.

The target does not operate in a confined space, and the total quantity of hydrogen/helium in the system is under 1000 standard liters. This presents a negligible oxygen deficiency risk in Hall B and therefore is a class-0 ODH installation.

Hydrogen shall be loaded into the system by qualified personnel only, and those personnel shall follow approved operational gas handling procedures. Upon loss of target gas pressure, the control system shall automatically shut off the gas supply.

The target control software includes numerous alarms (temperature, pressure, vacuum, etc.) to alert users to potential problems.

3.5.3 Responsible Personnel

The target system will be maintained by the Hall B Engineering Group.

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Engineering on call	Hall B	(757)-748-5048		1st contact
K. Bruhwel	Hall B	x7868	bruhwel@jlab.org	2nd contact
D. Insley	Hall B	x6071	dinsley@jlab.org	3rd contact
R. Miller	Hall B	x7867	rmiller@jlab.org	4th contact

Table 3.3: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 target system.

3.6 Hall B Gas System

The Hall B gas systems supply gas to the following detectors at the indicated pressures in Hall B:

1. Forward Drift Chambers
 - 10% CO₂ in Argon at 0.075 inch wc
 - N₂ purge for external HV components at atmospheric pressure
2. LTCC
 - C₄F₁₀ at 1.0 – 4.0 inch wc
 - N₂ purge for C₄F₁₀ recovery at 1.0 – 4.0 inch wc
3. RTPC
 - Pre-mixed Helium-CO₂ gas at atmospheric pressure at a ratio of 80%:20% by volume
4. RICH
 - N₂ purge for aerogel at atmospheric pressure
 - Air cooling purge supply for enclosed electronics package at 5-55 psi, discharges to atmosphere
 - Air compressor output at 112 psi
5. HTCC
 - CO₂ purge at 0.150 inch wc
6. FT
 - 10% C₄H₁₀ in Argon - 30 psi
 - N₂ purge for calorimeter at atmospheric pressure

The Hall B Gas Controls consists of a National Instruments cRIO based controls system that supplies and monitors gas flow to the four baseline gaseous detectors (DC, HTCC, LTCC, SVT). Additionally, it also controls and monitors gas supply to four non-baseline detectors (RICH, MVT, FT and RTPC).

The system consists of four stations strategically located in the hall and Gas Shed that are linked via the Slow Controls network. Each station consists of a cRIO controls chassis, a custom interface chassis, and a touch screen monitor. All gas system instrumentation equipment (transducers, mass flow controllers, valve drivers, etc.) receive operational power from supplies that are internal to the custom interface chassis.

The main controls interface for the system is located in the Gas Shed, where all functions of the system will be controlled. All system chassis are electrically grounded to the racks, and each contains an over-current protection fuse.

3.6.1 Hazards

The following cryogenes are used at the 96B Gas Shed at the following pressures;

- Liquid Argon - 175 – 200 psi
- Liquid Nitrogen - 45 psi
- Liquid CO₂ - 160 – 300 psi

The following gases are produced from cryogen boil off;

- Ar - 160 – 200 psi
- CO₂ - 160 – 200 psi
- N₂ - 35 psi

The following gases are used at the 96B Gas Shed at the following pressures;

- Ar - 40 – 200 psi
- CO₂ - 15 – 200 psi
- CF₄ - 40 psi

- C₄F₁₀ - 4 – 50 psi
- C₄H₁₀ - 40 psi
- N₂ - 35 psi

The following gas mixtures are produced at the following pressures;

- 10% CO₂ in Argon - 100 psi
- 10% C₄H₁₀ in Argon - 30 psi
- 10% CF₄ 10% C₄H₁₀ in Argon - 30 psi

The following gases and gas mixtures are sent to Hall B at the following pressures;

- 10% CO₂ in Argon - < 5 psi
- 20% CO₂ in Helium - < 5 psi
- 10% C₄H₁₀ in Argon - 30 psi
- 10% CF₄ 10% C₄H₁₀ in Argon - 30 psi
- N₂ - 35 psi
- CO₂ - 15 psi
- C₄F₁₀ - 4 – 8 psi

3.6.2 Mitigations

The 1500 gallon liquid-argon dewar and 160 liter liquid CO₂ dewar are used for gas supply only. The dewars have relief valves preventing over-pressure.

Liquid nitrogen is used in both gas and liquid states. The 1500 gallon LN₂ dewar has a relief valve preventing over-pressure.

N₂ gas is used as a purge gas for detectors and other equipment. The purge flow is controlled by mass flow controllers or flow rotometers and discharges to the atmosphere.

Detectors:

1. The Drift Chambers have both active and passive pressure protection. Pressure relief bubblers attached to the detector exhaust manifolds passively prevent the pressure from exceeding 0.125 inch wc pressure or vacuum. The active pressure protection system consists of a pressure transducer, process controller, and solenoid valves that isolate the detectors from the gas system if the pressure goes outside the 0.025 – 0.125 inch wc band. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low pressure and flows.

The N₂ purge for the endplate electronics is controlled by rotometers in the 96B Gas Shed. This purge discharges at atmospheric pressure.

2. The RTPC has both active and passive pressure protection. Active protections include sensors to read out absolute pressure and differential pressure between the RTPC and the DMS, as well as the RTPC and the helium buffer volume. All sensors, including the gas flow to the RTPC, are read out by slow control and interfaced with EPICS. Alarms and interlocks are implemented that will shut down gas flow if the pressure exceeds acceptable values. Passive protection consists of exhaust bubblers, including two overpressure bubblers venting directly to the Hall on both the RTPC gas inlet and the exhaust line.
3. The LTCC has both active and passive pressure protection. Pressure relief bubblers attached to the detector exhaust passively prevent the pressure from exceeding 4.00 inch wc or vacuum. The active pressure protection system consists of a pressure transducer, process controller, and solenoid valves that isolate the detector from the gas system if pressure goes outside the 1.00 – 3.00 inch wc pressure band. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low pressures.
4. The MVT gas mixing system supplies gas to the MVT and FT gas control chassis. The system has relief valves that prevent the gas supply and mixed gas pressure from exceeding 45 psi. A flammable gas detector is used at the valve panel in the 96B Gas Shed to warn of gas leakage. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low pressure.
5. The FT calorimeter has a N₂ purge to prevent condensation that discharges to the atmosphere at ambient pressure. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low flow.
6. The HTCC CO₂ purge flow is controlled by a MFC. Pressure relief bubblers attached to the detector volume, passively prevent pressure

from exceeding 0.125 inch wc or vacuum. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low pressure and flows.

7. The RICH air cooling supply has pressure relief valves at the compressor output, at the air receiver, and at the rotometer input to prevent an overpressure condition. The N₂ purge for the aerogel discharges to the atmosphere. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low pressure.
8. The SVT uses a N₂ purge in the local air volume to reduce humidity. There are EPICS-based alarms to alert personnel of high or low flow.

3.6.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the gas systems are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Engineering on call	Hall B	(757)-748-5048	–	1st contact

Table 3.4: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 Gas system.

3.7 DAQ and Trigger

The DAQ and Trigger systems consists of multiple VXS, VME and other crates housing various readout modules such as FADC250 ADCs, TDC1190 and TDC1290 TDCs, 16-channel discriminators, trigger modules, and various other units. These crates are powered by industrial power supplies, most of them produced by Wiener, Germany.

The computer cluster contains about 30 computers located mostly in the Hall B Counting House, but some computers are installed in the hall. The network consists of about 20 switches and routers located in both the Counting House and in the hall. Backup power is provided by three large UPS devices, one in the Counting House and two in the hall.

Signal and power transmission is handled by a large number of copper cables interconnecting the various electronics modules and detector elements. A smaller number of optical cables are employed to transmit synchronization, time-keeping signals, and various other communication services throughout the experimental hall.

3.7.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the electric power supplied to the electronic components. There is also a fire hazard associated with cabling throughout the experimental hall.

3.7.2 Mitigations

All of the crates and chassis are commercially available and are powered from 208 V AC. These meet stringent safety requirements set by various qualified agencies such as UL and TUV. Internal fans help manage thermal loads and several internal controls are implemented to provide limits on over-current and over-temperature excursions. All structures are grounded. Additionally, aluminum blank panels have been installed to limit access to the backplane on the rear of the chassis and on the front side where slots are unused. All power distribution is power-limited for current and voltage and interlocked via the Slow Controls system. All cables are NEC UL rated CL2 or better and conform to the 2017 edition of the NEC NFPA70 code requirements for fire prevention and thus, limit flame propagation in case of fire. Additionally, all cables are shielded and referenced to ground for added personnel and equipment safety.

There are possible electrical hazards if a malfunctioning electronics component is replaced. The associated task hazard analysis concluded that the consequence level is low, the probability level is low, and the risk code is 1. The mitigation for these electrical jobs is to place the equipment in Mode 0 (de-energized) when replacing or repairing hardware during routine maintenance.

3.7.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the DAQ and Trigger system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Sergey Boyarinov	Hall B	(757)-232-6221	boiarino@jlab.org	1st contact

Table 3.5: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 DAQ and Trigger system.

3.8 High Threshold Cherenkov Counter

The HTCC is a single unit detector that covers the entire working acceptance of CLAS12 in the forward direction. It is mounted on a special cart between the Central Detector and the Drift Chambers. The detector is connected to several systems: electronics including high and low voltage power supplies, gas supply line, and on-line monitoring and control equipment providing current status of the detector. The HTCC has 48 channels of Cherenkov light detection. For periodic checks and calibration, the detector is equipped with fast a Light Monitoring System. The HTCC is filled with dry CO₂ gas at room temperature and low positive differential pressure. It is directly connected to a CO₂ gas line and must be continuously purged to keep the relative humidity inside the detector below 3%. All controls and operations of the HTCC can be performed remotely.

3.8.1 Hazards

- 1). Operating High/Low Voltage Power Source.
- 2). ODH hazard when checking and/or maintaining components inside the HTCC Containment Vessel.
- 3). ODH hazard in case of the HTCC entry or exit composite windows failure (rupture or separation due to fatigue of the epoxy glue joints) leading to significant CO₂ gas leaks.
- 4). Hazard of rupture of the HTCC entry or exit composite windows leading to a sudden release of CO₂ gas with energy accumulated in the HTCC Containment Vessel.
- 5). Any mechanical shocks to the HTCC while moving the system on its cart in the hall.

3.8.2 Mitigations

Since the power of electrical equipment used in HTCC operations is low (less than 20 W), the electrical hazard is low and may occur only if connections are changed when power supply is on. Gas system hazards are also low because the working gas is non-toxic, non-flammable, and is used at low temperature and differential pressure. The volume of the detector is negligible as compared with the volume of Hall B. Damage of the detector during movement or alignment must be excluded by certified personnel performing tasks strictly following procedures established by the Hall B Engineering Group. All personnel are expected to work in accordance with the

OSP “Testing and Running of the High Threshold Cherenkov Counter of the CLAS12 Spectrometer in the Experimental Hall B”. The highest risk code after mitigation is 1.

3.8.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the HTCC system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-7174		1st contact
Y. Sharabian	JLab	(757)565-0619	youris@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.6: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 HTCC system.

3.9 Drift Chambers

The CLAS12 Drift Chamber (DC) system is comprised of 18 separate chambers. There are three types: “region 1”, “region 2”, and “region 3” depending on location upstream, within, or downstream of the CLAS Torus magnet. Each chamber has wires arranged in two superlayers of 6 layers by 112 wires. The gas system supplies mixed, clean, pressure-controlled argon/CO₂ gas to each of the 18 drift chambers. The on-chamber amplifier and readout boards are called “signal translator boards” (STBs). There are 7 such boards per superlayer. They distribute low voltage (LV) power to pre-amplifiers located on the board, one for each sense wire. The pre-amps are placed in groups of 16, with six such groups per board. There is an individual fuse for every group of sixteen. Thirty-four conductor signal cables (16 twisted-pair signals) connect each STB group of 16 pre-amps with one connector on the drift chamber readout board (DCRB). High voltage (HV) is supplied to the wires by on-chamber “high-voltage translator boards” (HVTBs), located on the opposite endplate from the STBs. The high voltage is supplied to the HVTBs by a chain of cables connecting the HV crates to the “high voltage distribution boards” (HVDBs) and from there by cables to the HVTBs.

3.9.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the high voltage supplied to the wires and the low voltage that powers the on-chamber pre-amplifiers. Hazards to the drift chambers themselves include damage to the gas windows should the pressure deviate more than a few psi from atmospheric.

3.9.2 Mitigations

Electrical hazards:

- High Voltage: high voltages up to 2000 V are used routinely for all detectors. Mitigation: very low current limits ($40 \mu\text{A}$) are set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. There are possible electrical hazards if a malfunctioning HV board is replaced. The associated task hazard analysis concluded that the consequence level is low, the probability level is low, and the risk code is 1. The mitigation for these electrical jobs is to place the equipment in Mode 0 (de-energized) when replacing or repairing hardware during routine maintenance. The same risk codes and mitigation applies to the procedure known as a “minimal disconnect” in which an individual HV pin is removed from the HV distribution box.
- Low Voltage: In order to power up the on-chamber electronics, we use low voltage at 7 V with 50 A per supply (1 supply per chamber). Mitigation: voltage is low enough not to be a danger to personnel, per EHS 6230 Table-1 this is Class-1. All the work will be done in Work Mode-0 (de-energized power supply). All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All cables and connectors are certified for this rating and shielded. To protect against possible over-heating of the on-chamber pre-amplifier boards, each individual conductor (positive and neutral return) is fused; with the fuses located in a fuse panel with a red LED signaling a blown fuse. If a fuse is removed and/or replaced there is no risk to personnel because of the low voltage.

Gas system hazards:

- Personnel: because most of the system operates very close to atmospheric pressure there is no hazard to personnel in the hall due to pressure. The gas is non-toxic and non-flammable. Because of the large volume of the hall and the location of the chambers in the main open area of the hall, there is no ODH hazard to personnel.
- Detectors: there is a potential danger to the chamber gas windows if the pressure in the chamber differs from atmospheric by one psi. This is mitigated during standard operation by our pressure-difference control system with fail-safe over-pressure and under-pressure bubblers providing an additional level of safety.

3.9.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the DC system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 329-4844		1st contact
Mac Mestayer	Hall B	(757)-229-6575	mestayer@jlab.org	

Table 3.7: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 DC system.

3.10 Low Threshold Cherenkov Counter

The CLAS12 Low Threshold Cherenkov Counter (LTCC) is composed of six identical detectors. The detectors are filled with C_4F_{10} gas supplied by the Hall-B Gas system. The gas is cleaned, re-circulated, and maintained at a pressure between 1 – 4 inches of wc with gas flow controllers and bubble pressure relief units. Each sector contains 36 PMTs energized by a HV power supply. Each PMT produces two outputs, connected to VME electronics (FADCs, TDCs) on the Forward Carriage.

3.10.1 Hazards

There are three hazards identified with operation of the LTCC system.

- Electrical hazard when the HVPS is energized for the PMTs.
- Fall hazards from using man-lifts or ladders to access system elements during maintenance and testing operations.
- Gas pressure hazards when the detector is pressurized with C_4F_{10} , typically 1 – 4 inches of wc.

3.10.2 Mitigations

The HV hazard is mitigated by the maximum current settings on the power supply. Any maintenance work will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.

Harness training, man-lift training, ladder training, and fall protection training provides mitigation for the fall hazard during the detector maintenance.

Detector pressure and vacuum is limited to a maximum of 4 inches of wc by the bubbler pressure relief units.

3.10.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the LTCC system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-7174		1st contact
Yu. Sharabian	JLab	x5829	youris@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.8: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 LTCC system.

3.11 Forward Time-of-Flight System

The Forward Time-of-Flight System (FTOF) is mounted on the Forward Carriage in Hall B. In each of the six sectors of CLAS12, the FTOF system is comprised of three arrays of counters, named panel-1a, panel-1b, and panel-2. Each of the panels consists of a set of rectangular scintillation counters with a PMT on each end. The panel-1a and panel-1b arrays are located at forward angles (roughly 5° to 35°) and the panel-2 arrays are located at larger angles (roughly 35° to 45°). In each sector the panel-1a arrays contain 23 counters, the panel-1b arrays contain 62 counters, and the panel-2 arrays contain 5 counters.

3.11.1 Hazards

There are two hazards associated with the FTOF system related to i) the high voltage (HV) system used to energize the counter PMTs and ii) access to the counters during testing operations.

The HV power supplies for each FTOF sector are either CAEN 1527LC mainframes or CAEN 4527 mainframes outfitted with negative polarity 24-channel A1535N modules. The typical settings for each channel are: $V = -2000$ V, $I = 350$ μ A. These supplies are located on the north and south sides of each level of the Forward Carriage behind each sector of counters. There are two hazards associated with the HV system when energized that must be mitigated. The first is the electrical hazard and the second is the potential damage to PMTs if a light leak is introduced in the counter wrapping material when the PMT is energized.

The panel-1b and panel-1a counters are positioned between the PCAL and LTCC detectors on the Forward Carriage. Therefore they are not accessible for hands-on testing. However, the panel-2 counters are accessible for hands-on testing when the Forward Carriage is pulled back into its maintenance position. The panel-2 counters in the S1, S2, S3, and S4 positions can then be accessed by manlift and the panel-2 counters in the S5 and S6 positions can be accessed by either manlift or ladders. When testing the panel-2 counters in such an operation there are fall hazards that must be mitigated.

3.11.2 Mitigations

The electrical hazard associated with the HV system would be to receive an electrical shock. However, the design of the HV system for the FTOF is such that the chance to receive an electrical shock is minimal. The electrical hazards are mitigated by the use of properly rated RG-59 cables that are terminated at the voltage divider end and the HV supply end. As well, the HV supplies are grounded to their electronics racks. The bigger issue would be damage to a PMT if improper contact with the counter surface were to occur that introduced a sizable light leak in the counter wrapping. However, the hazards in such a situation are minimal in that the HV system is designed to shutdown any channels that show an over-current condition, thereby protecting the system hardware.

Only authorized FTOF system personnel are allowed to work on the counters during hands-on testing when the Hall B configuration allows such work. For these individuals using ladders or manlifts, they are required to have all appropriate training including manlift and harness training, ladder training, and fall protection training. All work is carried out in conjunction with input from the FTOF Group Leader and the Hall B Work Coordinator. Any maintenance work related to HV will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.

3.11.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the FTOF system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
FTOF/CTOF on call	Hall B	(757)-344-7204		1st contact
D.S. Carman	Hall B	x5586	carman@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.9: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 FTOF system.

3.12 Electromagnetic Calorimeter

The CLAS12 Electromagnetic Calorimeter (EC) package includes both the legacy CLAS electromagnetic calorimeters (ECAL) and the new pre-shower calorimeter (PCAL) modules installed just upstream of ECAL. Both ECAL and PCAL are lead-scintillator sampling calorimeters consisting in total of 54 layers of 1-cm-thick scintillator strips and 52 layers of 2-mm-thick lead sheets. Photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) are used for light readout. The total number of readout channels is 2448. The nominal operational voltages for the ECAL and PCAL PMTs are 2200 V and 900 V, respectively.

3.12.1 Hazards

Hazards associated with this device are electrical shock or damage to the PMTs if the housing is opened with the HV on and the PMTs are exposed to room light. Access to some PMTs requires either ladders or manlift operations with potential fall hazards. Accessing signal cables below the floor gratings requires grating removal and poses a potential trip hazard over the open space.

3.12.2 Mitigations

Whenever any work has to be done on the calorimeter PMTs, the HV must be turned off. If work has to be done on the CAEN HV power supply, i.e. replacing HV cards, the HV mainframe must be powered off using the rear power switch to disable all circuits. Any maintenance work on the mainframe will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord. Both extension and step ladders must be secured to structural beams or rails when accessing PMTs, and a harness must be worn for manlift operations. Open floor gratings must be surrounded on both sides by warning cones or yellow rope.

3.12.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the EC system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757)-810-1489		1st contact
C. Smith	UVA/JLab		lcsmith@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.10: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 EC system.

3.13 Central Time-of-Flight System

The Central Time-of-Flight (CTOF) system consists of 48 92-cm-long scintillation bars that form a hermetic barrel that is positioned within the 5 T superconducting solenoid magnet. Each counter is read out on both ends using PMTs through long light guides. The PMTs reside in inhomogeneous fringe fields from the magnet at levels as large as 1 kG and must be operated within specially designed magnetic shields with compensation coils.

3.13.1 Hazards

There are four hazards associated with the CTOF system related to i) the high voltage (HV) system used to energize the counter PMTs, ii) the low voltage (LV) system used to energize the compensation coils of the PMT magnetic shields, iii) the solenoid magnetic field, and iv) access to the counters during testing operations.

The HV power supply for the CTOF counters is a CAEN SY1527 mainframes outfitted with negative polarity 24-channel A1535N modules. The typical settings for each channel are: $V = -2000$ V, $I = 350$ μ A. This supply is located on the south side of Level-1 of the Space Frame. There are two hazards associated with the HV system when energized that must be mitigated. The first is the electrical hazard and the second is the potential damage to PMTs if a light leak is introduced in the counter wrapping material when the PMT is energized.

The LV power supplies for the CTOF magnetic shield compensation coils are Wiener MPV8016I modules in an MPOD-mini crate located on the south side of Level-1 of the Space Frame. Each module has eight channels that can individually provide up to 50 W per channel with a maximum current of 5 A. There are two hazards associated with the LV system when energized that must be mitigated. The first is the electrical hazard and the second

is the possible shield over-temperature condition if the supply current is set too high.

The CTOF detectors are positioned in the magnetic field of the CLAS12 solenoid. When the solenoid is energized to its full nominal current, the central field strength is 5 T and the field strength at the location of the PMTs is at the level of 1 kG. This field level presents a possible hazard to both personnel and to the CTOF detectors (as well as the other detectors in located about the solenoid) that must be mitigated.

During testing it is possible to access the counter light guides, PMTs, and magnetic shields through the use of ladders and platforms, and possibly via manlifts. When testing the CTOF counters in such an operation there are fall hazards that must be mitigated.

3.13.2 Mitigations

The electrical hazard associated with the HV system would be to receive an electrical shock. However, the design of the HV system for the CTOF is such that the chance to receive an electrical shock is minimal. The electrical hazards are mitigated by the use of properly rated RG-59 cables that are terminated at the voltage divider end and the HV supply end. As well, the HV supplies are grounded to their electronics racks. The bigger issue would be damage to a PMT if improper contact with the counter surface were to occur that introduced a sizable light leak in the counter wrapping. However, the hazards in such a situation are minimal in that the HV system is designed to shutdown any channels that show an over-current condition, thereby protecting the system hardware.

The electrical hazard associated with the LV system would be to receive an electrical shock. However, the design of the LV system for the CTOF is such that the chance to receive an electrical shock is minimal. The electrical hazards are mitigated by the use of properly rated power cables that are terminated at the shield end and the LV supply end. As well, the LV supplies are grounded to their electronics racks. Any maintenance work on power supplies will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.

Another issue with the power supplies is that the higher the current setting, the higher the temperature of the shields. The shields are outfitted with a thermistor system to monitor their temperature through EPICS. This system is connected to an interlock on the supply to kill the power if the shield temperature reaches $\sim 90^{\circ}\text{F}$. The nominal operating currents for the shields are in the range from 0.5 A to 1.0 A where the shield temperature

remains at room temperature.

The magnetic field hazard associated with the CTOF system must be mitigated for both personnel and detectors. Normally no servicing work is to be done on the CTOF counters when the solenoid is energized. This mitigates any hazards associated with personnel working in a strong magnetic field environment. However, there are specific situations where the upstream PMTs need to be accessed with the field on and personnel will be working within the 1 kG fringe field of the magnet. Personnel working in the proximity of the solenoid when it is energized must be concerned with the following hazards:

- Danger of metal objects being attracted by the magnet fringe field and becoming airborne, possibly pinching body parts or damaging equipment,
- Danger of cardiac pacemakers or other electronic medical devices no longer functioning properly in the presence of magnetic fields,
- Danger of metallic medical implants (non-electronic) being adversely affected by magnetic fields,
- Loss of information from magnetic data storage driver such as tapes, disks, credit cards, etc.

Only trained and qualified CTOF personnel may work on the CTOF system (and only at the location of the upstream PMTs) with the solenoid energized. This is important to minimize danger to personnel and to the detectors themselves. Also, after any sort of maintenance work is done on the CTOF, the area must be inspected and all ferromagnetic tools and equipment must be removed before the solenoid field is ramped up again.

Only authorized CTOF system personnel are allowed to work on the counters during hands-on testing when the Hall B configuration allows for such work. For these individuals using ladders, platforms, or manlifts, they are required to have all appropriate training including manlift and harness training, ladder training, and fall protection training. All work is carried out in conjunction with input from the CTOF Group Leader and the Hall B Work Coordinator.

3.13.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for CTOF the system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
FTOF/CTOF on call	Hall B	(757)-344-7204		1st contact
D.S. Carman	Hall B	x5586	carman@jlab.org	2nd contact

Table 3.11: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 CTOF system.

3.14 Silicon Tracker

The CLAS12 SVT will be removed before RG F and will not be in use during the duration of RG F.

3.15 Radial Time Projection Chamber

3.15.1 Overview

The CLAS12 Radial Time Projection Chamber (RTPC) is a composed of two parts. The main one is a cylindrical gaseous detector which uses two different gas mixtures. The second part is a small detector called Drift Monitoring System (DMS). With respect to hazards there is no difference between the RTPC and the DMS as they use the same gases. The material in this chapter is a subset of the material in the full CLAS12 Radial Time Projection Chamber operations manual and is only intended to familiarize people with the hazards and responsible personnel for these systems. In no way it should be taken as sufficient information to use or operate this equipment.

3.15.2 RTPC Construction

The RTPC is composed of two 40 cm long concentric cylinders whose longitudinal axis is the beam line. The first cylinder between the target wall ($R=3$ mm) and the ground foil ($R=20$ mm) is filled with pure Helium. The second cylinder starts right after the ground foil and finishes at a radius of 79 mm by the readout pad board. The gas that will be used for this second space is a mixture of 80% of Helium and 20% of carbon dioxide. As no flammable gas is used, the apparatus is of a class-0 gaseous device.

Three groups of elements of the detector are energized electrically:

- the cathode foil
- 3 Gas Electron Multiplier (GEM) foils are used to amplify the signal

- the two end caps of the cylinder are electrified via voltage dividers to ensure the electric field uniformity inside the detector

In total the RTPC is powered by 7 high voltage channels up to 7000V, even though the current limit for both HV is extremely low. One high voltage channel is used for the cathode foil and the 6 others are connected to the GEM foils. The end caps are powered via the inner most GEM foil and the cathode. The detectors are read through 1.5m-long flex cables by Front-End Units (FEU). These electronic cards contain the customized DREAM ASICs in order to sample the detector signal and a Flash-ADC to digitize it and send it to the network. The FEUs are placed inside customized crates, on the back of the support tube holding the RTPC. They are powered through low voltage, and kept within the 40-60°C temperature range using a simple set of fans and tubing.

3.15.2.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the use of high voltage and the low voltage which powers the readout electronics. During the installation phase, mechanical hazards include the risks associated with the weight of the RTPC including its support tube as well as the work at height in order to access LV and gas control crates.

Hazards to the RTPC detectors themselves include mechanical damage, gas leaks and gas over-pressure. Hazards to the RTPC and personnel may arise from the presence of high magnetic field near the detectors.

Hazards concerning the RTPC Front-End Units include: wrong LV settings that could damage the FEUs, absence of cooling or cooling failure which would overheat the cards.

3.15.2.2 Mitigations

Electrical hazards (personnel):

1. High Voltage: high voltage up to 7000V are used routinely for all detectors. Mitigation: very low current limit (1 mA) is set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All components are connected to standard HV power supplies through HV cables rated for the maximally occurring voltage, with standard HV connectors. The energized foils and circuit boards are fully encapsulated inside the RTPC, inaccessible to outside contact. Any maintenance work will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.

2. Low Voltage: In order to power up the front end electronics, we use low voltage at 4.5 V with 60 A per crate. Mitigation: voltage is low, per EHS 6239 Table 1 this Class2 hazard. All maintenance work will be done by a trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle with positive control of the cord. Trained personal may work alone. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All cables and connectors are certified for this rating and shielded.

Mechanical hazards (personnel):

1. Heavy object (Total: 200kg), handled with an overhead crane. Mitigation: job done by trained Jlab staff according to and compliant with Jefferson Lab EHS&Q.
2. Work at height for access to gas control and LV crate (located at 2.5m height) on the moving cart. Mitigation: use of certified step ladder provided by JLab.

Other hazards to RTPC:

1. Detectors: gas over-pressure, gas leaks, mechanical damage. Mitigation: gas control system with over-pressure and leak limits.
2. Electronics: wrong LV settings, absence of cooling or cooling failure. Mitigation: Slow control read-back of LV setting before turning on the Front-End electronics. Cooling is also checked by slow-control, and is interlocked so that the electronics cannot be turned on when the cooling is off. Also, temperature sensors are present on the Front End cards and are directly interlocked so that if temperature goes beyond a predefined threshold, cards are gracefully shut-down automatically.
3. High Magnetic Fields: A hazard for personnel and equipment may arise if maintenance operations are performed while magnets are energized. Mitigation: The detector area is not accessible during regular CLAS12 operation; accessing the detector area implies the displacement of the moving cart that requires the solenoid magnet to be turned off. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons.

3.15.3 Drift Monitoring System

The DMS is a wire chamber used to monitor the electron drift time. The gas that will be used for the DMS is a mixture of 80% of Helium, 20%

of CO₂. As there is no flammable gas, the apparatus is a class-0 gaseous device. About 50 wires are used to guarantee a homogeneous electric field, their potential varies from 4000 V to 100 V. One more wire is used as an anode. Two ⁹⁰Sr radioactive sources are placed inside the detector. They can not be removed from the detector and are shielded such that handling the detector does not require any specific care. Finally, two scintillators are used as for trigger.

The DMS is powered by 3 high voltages up to 4000V, even though the current limit for all three HV is extremely low (< 1 mA). The detector is read through a capacitively coupled cable using standard NIM electronics. The scintillators are readout by PMTs.

All hazards and mitigation options for the DMS are the same as for the RTPC. Even though the shapes of the detectors vary, they are almost identical in principle.

3.15.3.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the use of high voltage for the wires and PMTs, the low voltage which powers the readout electronics, and the presence of two radioactive sources.

Hazards to the DMS detectors themselves include mechanical damage, gas leaks and gas over-pressure. Hazards to the DMS and personnel may arise from the presence of high magnetic field near the detectors.

3.15.3.2 Mitigations

Electrical hazards (personnel):

1. High Voltage: high voltage up to 4000V are used routinely for all detectors. Mitigation: very low current limit (< 1 mA) is set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. Standard HV cables and connectors are used throughout. No HV-energized elements are accessible from the outside of the detector, which sits in a fully grounded metallic enclosure. Any maintenance work on the power supply will be done by a trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.
2. The readout electronics is contained in an industry-standard NIM crate which is powered by a standard 110 V outlet and power cord. No hazardous voltages are accessible to operators.

Mechanical hazards (personnel):

1. Work at height for access to gas control on the RTPC gas panel. Mitigation: use of certified step ladder provided by JLab.

Radioactive hazards:

1. Two ^{90}Sr radioactive sources are sealed in the DMS detector. Mitigation: they can not be removed from it without dismounting the whole detector. The shielding around the detector is sufficient for the detector to be handled as a standard detector. The activity of the sources is $2\ \mu\text{Ci}$, each. A sign on the detector indicates not to open the detector as two radioactive sources are inside. The type or source and activities of the two sources are also indicated on this sign.

Other hazards to DMS:

1. Detectors: gas over-pressure, gas leaks, mechanical damage. Mitigation: gas control system with over-pressure and leak limits.
2. High Magnetic Fields: A hazard for personnel and equipment may arise if maintenance operations are performed while magnets are energized. Mitigation: The detector area is not accessible during regular CLAS12 operation; accessing the detector area implies the displacement of the moving cart that requires the solenoid magnet to be turned off. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons.
3. The source is collimated, shielding has been added to ensure that no external radiation is expected when touching the detector.

3.15.4 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the RTPC system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call	Hall-B	(757) 541-7539		1st contact
M. Hattawy	ODU	+1 (423) 596-8352	hattawy@jlab.org	2nd contact
S. Kuhn	ODU	+1 (757) 639-6640	kuhn@jlab.org	3rd contact
S. Bültmann	ODU	+1 (757) 232-5368	sbuelتما@odu.edu	4th contact
E. Christy	Hampton U.		christy@jlab.org	5th contact

Table 3.12: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 RTPC system.

3.16 Central Neutron Detector

The Central Neutron Detector (CND) is the outer-most detector of the CLAS12 Central Detector. The CND is a barrel of plastic scintillator bars of trapezoidal shape, all with their long sides parallel to the beam direction.

The light emitted by the scintillators of the CND is read out only at the upstream end of each bar with a Hamamatsu R10533 photomultiplier placed in the low-field region of the solenoid and connected to the bar by a ~ 1.5 -m-long bent light guide; the downstream end of each bar is connected via a “U-turn” light guide to the neighboring paddle. In this way, the light emitted at the downstream end of each scintillator is fed through its neighboring paddle and read out by the PMT connected to its end. Each PMT is encased in a cylindrical magnetic shield made up by a 1-mm-thick layer of mu-metal and a 5-mm-thick layer of mild steel.

The CND is composed of 48 azimuthal segments and 3 layers in the radial direction, for a total of 144 scintillator bars, 144 PMTs, 72 U-turn light guides, and 144 bent light guides.

In order to operate the PMTs, high voltages (typically in the range of 1500 V) are provided by a multi-channel CAEN SY527 power supply. The signal of each PMT is sent to an active splitter. The three splitter modules used for the CND were originally developed by IPN Orsay for the G0 experiment (Hall C, Jefferson Lab). Each module is an active 64-channel splitter with unity gain so there is no loss of amplitude. The 64 SMA inputs are placed in the back panel. In the front panel there are 8 8-channel output connectors (DMCH) for the timing signals and 4 16-channel output connectors (FASTBUS) for the charge signals. The charge signal is sent from the splitter to the flash-ADC (250 VXS, 16 channels/board, made and owned by JLab). The timing signal from the splitter is sent to a constant fraction discriminator (CFD) GAN'ELEC FCC8, developed for the TAPS Collaboration. The module is an 8-channel CAMAC unit with LEMO 00 input connectors and 2x 8-pin output connectors in differential ELC. The threshold can be set for each channel individually and no time-walk adjustment is required for the module. The discriminated timing signal then goes to the TDC (CAEN VX1290A, 32 channels/board, 25 ps/channel resolution). In total, the read-out of the CND includes 3 splitter modules, 19 CFD modules, 5 TDC boards, and 8 ADC boards.

3.16.1 Hazards

3.16.1.1 Electrical Hazard

The electrical hazard to personnel can come from the high voltage that powers the PMTs, which need about 1500 V to function.

3.16.1.2 Magnetic Field Hazard

The strong magnetic field of the solenoid (5 T) represents a hazard for all detectors of the CND.

3.16.2 Mitigations

3.16.2.1 Electrical Hazard Mitigations

The maximum current provided by the HV distribution boards is quite low (3 mA). All mechanical structures are properly grounded. The HV boards must not be accessed during operation; during maintenance work, performed by trained personnel, the HV is turned off, cables are disconnected from the power supply and the power supply is turned off. Any maintenance work on PS will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.

3.16.2.2 Magnetic Field Hazard Mitigations

Whenever any work has to be done on the CND, the magnetic field of the solenoid must be turned off. After any sort of maintenance work is done on the CND, the area must be inspected and all ferromagnetic tools and equipment must be removed before the field is ramped up again. Also, before the field can be turned on the PMT housings and magnetic shields should be thoroughly inspected to make sure that they are properly secured and that there are no loose parts.

3.16.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the CND system are:

3.17 Micromegas Vertex Tracker

The CLAS12 Micromegas Vertex Tracker (MVT) apparatus is comprised of the Barrel Micromegas Tracker (BMT) and the Forward Micromegas Tracker

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-7204		1st contact
S. Niccolai	IPN Orsay	+33 6 24 81 67 78	silvia@jlab.org	2nd contact
D. Sokhan	Glasgow	+ 44 7949 175725	daria@jlab.org	3rd contact
D.S. Carman	JLab	(757)-269-5586	carman@jlab.org	JLab contact

Table 3.13: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 CND system.

(FMT), which despite their different shapes (cylinders or disks), are the same type of detector and therefore have the same list of hazards. Both subsystems are gaseous detectors, the only difference with respect to the hazards is the use of different gases for the BMT and the FMT.

For Run Group F (BONuS12), the BMT will be removed and replaced by the RTPC. In the forward direction, a new FMT built at Saclay will be installed, which has only 3 layers (instead of six) and is made of more light-weight material. Otherwise, the new FMT will be similar to the previous one and will use the same gases, HV and other ancillary equipment. For that reason, we retain below the full description of the MVT for reference - all statements about hazards and their mitigation apply.

The BMT is composed of 3 double-layers of resistive cylindrical Micromegas detectors, each layer is divided into 3 sectors, for a total of 18 detectors. In combination with the Silicon Vertex Tracker, the BMT covers the polar angle region from 35° to 125° around the target. Micromegas detectors are double-stage gaseous detectors. The gas that will be used for the BMT is a mixture of 90% argon and 10% isobutane. Even though isobutane is a flammable gas, the amount of gas in use at any given time is well within the range of a class-0 gaseous device.

The BMT is powered by two high voltages up to 2000 V, although the current limit for both HV is extremely low. The detectors are read out through 1.5-m-long flex cables by Front-End Units (FEU). These electronic cards contain the customized DREAM ASICs in order to sample the detector signal and a flash-ADC to digitize it and send it to the network. The FEUs are placed inside customized crates, on the back of the support tube holding the MVT. They are powered through low voltage, and kept within the 40°C to 60°C temperature range using a simple set of fans and tubing.

The FMT is composed of 6 flat resistive Micromegas detectors. Each detector is divided in two zones (inner and outer). The FMT covers the polar angle region from 6° to 29° from the target. Micromegas detectors are double-stage gaseous detectors. The gas that will be used for the BMT

is a mixture of 80% Argon, 10% CF_4 , and 10% isobutane. Even though isobutane is a flammable gas, the amount of gas in use at any given time is well within the range of a class-0 gaseous device.

The FMT is powered by three high voltages up to 2000 V, although the current limit for all three HV is extremely low (<1 mA). The detectors are read out through 2.2-m-long flex cables by Front-End Units (FEU). These electronic cards contain the customized DREAM ASICs in order to sample the detector signal and a flash-ADC to digitize it and send it to the network. The FEUs are placed inside customized crates, located on the back of the support tube holding the MVT. They are powered through low voltage, and kept within the 40°C to 60°C temperature range using a simple set of fans and tubing.

All hazards and mitigation options for the FMT are the same as for the BMT. Even though the shapes of the detectors vary, they are almost identical in principle. The gas mixture is however different, but the amount of flammable gas (isobutane) is almost the same.

3.17.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the use of flammable gas, high voltage, and the low voltage that powers the readout electronics. During the installation phase, mechanical hazards include the risks associated with the weight of the MVT, including its support tube, as well as the work at height in order to access the LV and gas control crates.

Hazards to the MVT detectors themselves include mechanical damage, gas leaks, and gas over-pressure. Also, there is a risk of damage to the MVT during installation in the solenoid bore.

Hazards concerning the MVT Front-End Units include: wrong LV settings that could damage the FEUs, and absence of cooling or cooling failure that would overheat the cards.

3.17.2 Mitigations

Fire hazards (equipment and personnel):

- Use of flammable gas: All MVT detectors use 10% isobutane, which is flammable. Mitigation: the amount of isobutane in our system is very limited. For both the BMT and FMT detectors, the total combustion energy is equivalent to less than 12 g of hydrogen, which makes it a class-0 gas system (class-1 starts at 600 g).

Electrical hazards (personnel):

- High Voltage: high voltage up to 2500 V are used routinely for all detectors. Mitigation: very low current limit (10 μ A) is set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded.
- Low Voltage: In order to power up the front-end electronics, we use low voltage at 4.5 V with 60 A per crate. Mitigation: voltage is low per EHS 6239 Table 1 this Class2 hazard. All maintenance work will be done trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle with positive control of the cord.. Trained personal may work alone. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All cables and connectors are certified for this rating and shielded.

Mechanical hazards (personnel):

- Heavy object (Total: 200 kg), handled with an overhead crane. Mitigation: job done by trained JLab staff according to and compliant with the Jefferson Lab EHS&Q manual.
- Work at height for access to gas control and LV crate (located at 2.5 m height) on the moving cart. Mitigation: use of certified step ladder provided by JLab.

Other hazards to MVT:

- Detectors: gas over-pressure, gas leaks, and mechanical damage. Mitigation: gas control system with over-pressure and leak limits. Protection covers (1 mm carbon shell) in order to avoid as much as possible damage to the detectors before installation and operation. The FMT detectors can be dismounted and repaired in case of accidental damage to the drift electrode. Since they are tightly stacked, only one such electrode is exposed and at risk, the rest of the stack is protected by the first detector.
- Installation of Central Tracker: Damage to the MVT during installation in the solenoid bore. The CTOF is the closest detector to MVT. Mitigation: Parts of the MVT that are radially farthest outwards are surveyed prior to insertion into the solenoid to ensure that there is no interference with adjacent CTOF components. There is a large clearance (\sim 11 mm) between the MVT and the adjacent detector, CTOF. The insertion will be achieved on a precision rail system that is used for the target insertion. There will be a constant visual check

as the MVT is inserted into the solenoid bore. A linkage mechanism on the upstream end of the SVT/MVT allows for the adjustments in pitch and yaw if needed. Finally, the operation will be performed by trained personnel with several years of experience and familiar with similar positioning.

- Electronics: wrong LV settings and absence of cooling or cooling failure. Mitigation: Slow Controls read-back of LV settings before turning on the front-end electronics. Cooling is also checked by the Slow Controls system, and is interlocked so that the electronics cannot be turned on when the cooling is off. Also, temperature sensors are present on the front-end cards and are directly interlocked so that if temperature goes beyond a predefined threshold, the cards are gracefully shut-down automatically.

3.17.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the MVT system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call	Hall-B	(757) 541-7539		1st contact
M. Defurne	Saclay	+33169083237	maxime.defurne@cea.fr	2nd contact
F. Sabatie	Saclay	+33169083206	franck.sabatie@cea.fr	3rd contact
S. Aune	Saclay	+33169086648	stephan.aune@cea.fr	4th contact

Table 3.14: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 MVT system.

3.18 Ring Imaging Cherenkov Counter

The Ring Imaging Cherenkov detector (RICH) is designed to improve the CLAS12 particle identification in the momentum range from 3 to 8 GeV and will replace sector-4 of the existing LTCC detectors. The Ring Imaging Cherenkov Counter incorporates:

1. Aerogel radiator. Aerogel is very light material, non-toxic, and non-flammable but hygroscopic.
2. Focusing mirror system. Mirrors reduce the detection area instrumented by the photo-detectors to $\sim 1 \text{ m}^2$.

3. Photo-detector. The photo-detector includes 391 Hamamatsu multi-anode photomultipliers (MAPMTs). Each MAPMT has 64 pixels, so the detector has 25024 channels.
4. High Voltage. High voltage is supplied to each MAPMT. The MAPMT high voltage will be less than 1100 V and the divider current is 225 μA . The power consumption for all MAPMTs is ~ 100 W.
5. Front-end electronics. The front-end electronics consist of three types of boards: adapter board, ASIC board, and FPGA board. There are two types of the front-end boards: 3 MAPMTs tiles and 2 MAPMTs tiles. The photo-matrix has 23 boards with two MAPMTs and 115 boards with three MAPMTs. In total the RICH has 138 tiles of each type.
6. Low voltage system. The typical current draw is 0.8 A for the FPGA and ASIC boards together (3 MAROC version) from a +5 V source. The power used for the 2 MAROC ASIC setup will be slightly less. The total power consumption will be not more than 500 W.
7. Cooling system. The RICH detector electronics are sealed inside the detector. The heat generated by the HV and LV circuits must be removed in order to prevent damage to the electronics package and the adjacent FTOF panel. Air cooling was determined to be the viable method.
8. The Nitrogen Purge System. In order to preserve the aerogel optical performance, the RICH box environment must be kept dry by flushing with nitrogen gas. The nitrogen purge system supplies the amount of gas necessary to fill the box (about 5 m³) and to compensate for the gas leakage. A complete refill of the volume each day is expected under normal operating conditions. A slight over-pressure of 0.5 mbar prevents contamination from the outside air.

3.18.1 Hazards

Hazards associated with the RICH detector:

1. Electrical shock from touching exposed wires or damage to the MAPMTs if the detector enclosure is opened with HV on.
2. Heat buildup inside the RICH enclosure if the cooling system is not running. This may cause damage to the experimental equipment.

3. The degradation of aerogel properties due to uncontrolled humidity in the experimental hall.

3.18.2 Mitigations

1. Whenever any work has to be done on the RICH detector, whether it will be opened or not, the HV and LV must be turned off. The cooling system has to be turned off if the enclosure is opened for maintenance. The door interlock will turn off the HV to prevent touching exposed HV cables or damage of the MAPMTs in case the door is opened accidentally. Any maintenance work on the power supplies will be done by trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle if needed with a positive control of the cord.
2. The air cooling and nitrogen purge systems monitor key detector parameters. If the monitored signals are outside of pre-programmed limits, the air cooling system shuts off voltage to the electronics.

The signals monitored for air cooling include:

- Air flow
- Detector internal temperature
- Pressure inside air tank
- Air compressor power status

High capacity air compressors supply clean dry air at room temperature to cool the electronics package inside the detector. The plan is to have two compressors in parallel charging a 1000 l capacity air tank. Air pressure is reduced to supply manual valve flow meters, one per detector. In the case of a power outage, the air tank should contain sufficient air to remove the latent heat of the electronics package.

Powering up the electronics package inside the RICH without cooling may result in severe damage. Interlocking the RICH HV and LV power supply operation to proper cooling circuit operation eliminates this hazard. The interlocks perform two functions in the case of a cooling system fault:

- Turn off power to the electronics package,
- Prevent energizing the electronics package.

There are 3 cooling circuit interlocks:

- Air compressor operation: minimum one compressor operating,
- Minimum air pressure in tank,
- Minimum cooling air flow.

All three interlocks must be true in order for the electronics package to have power.

3. The aerogel used in the RICH detector requires very dry air in order to perform properly. The nitrogen purge gas system provides gas at low humidity levels.

The signals monitored for the nitrogen purge system include:

- Nitrogen flow,
- Detector internal humidity.

If the monitored signals are outside of pre-programmed limits, the nitrogen purge system sets off an alarm.

3.18.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the RICH detector are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call	Hall B	(757) 344-3235		1st contact
V. Kubarovsky	Hall B	x5649	vpk@jlab.org	2nd contact
M. Mirazita	INFN	x6273	mirazita@jlab.org	3rd contact
M. Contalbrigo	INFN	x6273	mcontalb@jlab.org	4th contact
A. Kim	UConn	x6356	kenjo@jlab.org	5th contact

Table 3.15: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 RICH detector.

3.19 Forward Tagger System

The Forward Tagger system consists of three subsystems: an electromagnetic calorimeter (FT-Cal), a plastic scintillator hodoscope (FT-Hodo), and a MicroMegas-based tracker (FT-Trk). During Run Group F (BONuS12), the FT will not be used and hence all high voltages will be set to zero. The Moller shield will be installed in the “FTOff” configuration, so that no scattered particles will reach the active FT volume. However, the FT will

not be physically removed, and hence we keep the description of it below for reference.

One (or more) *expert on-call* will be temporary assigned during the run time from a pull of subsystem experts (see Tab. 3.17, Tab. 3.18, and Tab. 3.19). In the following, details are reported for each of the three sub-components.

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call	INFN	(757) 344-1848		1st contact

Table 3.16: FT experts on call.

3.19.1 Forward Tagger Calorimeter

The Forward Tagger calorimeter (FT-Cal) consists of 332 lead-tungstate (PbWO_4) crystals with avalanche photodiode (APD) readout and amplifiers enclosed inside a temperature-controlled enclosure. The crystals are arranged in a circular matrix positioned around the beamline. The system is located in proximity of magnets, in an area where the fringe field is of the order of a few hundred gauss. In order to operate the calorimeter, high voltage and low voltage are supplied to each channel. The high voltage is < 420 V and < 50 μA . The required low voltage is ± 5 V for the preamplifier boards and 12 V for the Light Monitoring System. Constant temperature inside the enclosure is kept by running a coolant through the copper pipes that are integrated into the enclosure using a laboratory chiller. The cooling system should provide temperature stability at the level of 1°C . To avoid moisture build-up in the calorimeter enclosure, a steady flow of nitrogen gas is maintained and the temperature and humidity in the calorimeter enclosure are monitored with sensors interfaced to the CLAS12 Slow Controls system.

3.19.1.1 Hazards

Hazards to personnel associated with this device are high voltage, which is supplied to the photosensors, and low voltage, which powers the calorimeter preamplifiers and Light Monitoring System. Hazards to the detector include cooling fluid leaks or condensation in the photosensors and preamplifier region, over-voltage to the photosensors, preamplifiers or Light Monitoring System that could damage the related subsystem, and absence of cooling or cooling failure when low voltage is applied to the preamplifiers, which

could lead to overheating of the preamplifiers themselves. To account for the presence of fringe magnetic fields from the CLAS12 magnets in the system location, no ferric materials are employed in the detector: a hazard may nevertheless arise during maintenance operations in case metallic tools are used and for people with cardiac pacemakers, other electrical medical devices, or metallic implants.

3.19.1.2 Mitigations

Mitigation of risks associated with FT-Cal operations are achieved in the following ways:

- Electrical shock: there is only a low level hazard for personnel related to the limited voltage/current range in use. Nevertheless, during maintenance periods, HV and LV power needs to be off before working on the calorimeter, cables disconnected, and lock and tags supplied;
- to avoid any damage to photosensors and preamplifiers, hardware interlocks prevent any incorrect HV/LV settings;
- to avoid any damage to preamplifiers due to a possible coolant leakage, all cooling lines will be tested at high pressure and chiller parameters and temperatures monitored; hardware interlocks switch off the chiller in case of monitored parameters outside allowed range;
- over-temperature causing damage to the preamplifiers will be avoided by continuously monitoring the status of the cooling and calorimeter temperature; interlocks will trigger HV/LV turn-off if the temperature exceeds the set values.

3.19.1.3 Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Personnel)

High Voltage: high voltage up to 420 V is supplied to the photosensors (Hamamatsu S8664-1010 Large Area Avalanche Photodiode or LAAPD). Mitigation: a very low current limit ($50 \mu\text{A}$) is set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. HV distribution boards on the detector cannot be accessed during operation; during maintenance work, performed by trained personnel, the HV cables are disconnected from the power supply and the power supply locked and tagged.

Low Voltage: In order to power up the LAAPD preamplifier and Light Monitoring System, we use low voltage at ± 5 V and 12 V, respectively with a maximum current of 4 A. Mitigation: voltage is low enough not to be

a danger to personnel, per EHS 6230 Table-1 this is Class-1 hazard. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All cables and connectors are certified for this rating. LV distribution boards on the detector cannot be accessed during operation; during maintenance work, performed by trained personnel, the LV cables are disconnected from the power supply and the power supply locked and tagged, Work Mode-1.

3.19.1.4 Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Equipment)

High Voltage: if high voltage is applied when the low voltage is turned off, the LAAPD preamplifiers may be damaged. Mitigation: the HV operation is interlocked to the LV settings, so that HV cannot be supplied if LV is off.

Over-voltage: applying HV and LV above certain values can damage the photosensors and preamplifiers. Mitigation: both HV and LV are monitored via the EPICS Slow Controls system; reading above predefined limits will automatically trigger the supplied voltage to be turned off.

3.19.1.5 Other Hazards Mitigation

Cooling fluid: leaks of the cooling fluid may cause damage to the calorimeter preamplifiers or nearby electronic components. Mitigations: during the design phase the cooling circuit path was chosen in order to minimize risks and, after the assembly, was tested at high pressure to verify the absence of leaks. During operation the temperature, level, and pressure of the liquid at the chiller output, as well as the temperatures of the calorimeter inlet and outlet lines, are monitored continuously via the EPICS Slow Controls system: any significant temperature variation (more than 1°C) or sudden pressure variation must be investigated. The chiller operation is interlocked to these parameters so that variation outside appropriate limits will trigger the chiller being turned off.

Moisture: since the calorimeter is operated at 0°C, moisture may build up in the system enclosure if the nitrogen gas flow is interrupted. Mitigation: the humidity inside the calorimeter enclosure is monitored via sensors; the operation of the LV and HV supplies are interlocked to the humidity readings so that, if the humidity exceeds a predefined threshold, both supplies will be automatically turned off.

Over-temperature: absence of cooling or cooling failure when LV is supplied to the preamplifiers may cause over-heating of the preamplifiers and other calorimeter components. Mitigation: cooling status and temperature inside the calorimeter enclosure are monitored and interlocked to the LV op-

eration so that when the cooling is not in operation or temperatures exceed predefined limits, the LV is turned off.

Magnetic field: a hazard for personnel and equipment may arise if maintenance operations are performed while magnets are energized. Mitigation: the detector area is not accessible during regular CLAS12 operation; accessing the detector area implies the displacement of other CLAS12 subsystems that requires the magnet to be turned off. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons.

3.19.1.6 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the FT-Cal system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-1848		1st contact
R. De Vita	INFN	x7266	devita@jlab.org	2nd contact
M. Battaglieri	INFN	x7266	battaglieri@jlab.org	3rd contact

Table 3.17: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 FT-Cal subsystem.

3.19.2 Forward Tagger Hodoscope

The Forward Tagger Hodoscope (FT-Hodo) consists of 232 plastic scintillator tiles (Eljen EJ 204) coupled to 6-m-long optical fibers with SiPM readout, preamplifier, and mezzanine and control electronic PCBs enclosed in an electronics crate. The system is located in the proximity of magnets, in an area where the fringe field is of the order of a few hundred gauss.

The FT-Hodo Light Monitoring System consists of a 420 nm (violet) peaked LED (Thorlabs M420F2), LED driver (LED D1B T-Cube), ten optical fibers, and eight cylindrical diffusers (Medilight). The LED and driver are located in the electronics rack and the optical diffusers are located in the plastic scintillator enclosure, four in each layer.

3.19.2.1 Hazards

Hazards are electric shock if the electronics enclosure is opened without switching off the HV and LV, or exposure to non-ionizing UV radiation if the UV LED safety mitigations are not adhered to.

The LED is capable of producing high intensity UV light, which poses an eye and skin hazard.

The SiPMs can be damaged if they are subjected to over-voltage or over-current and are sensitive to electrostatics.

To account for the presence of fringe magnetic fields from the CLAS12 magnets in the system location, no ferric materials are employed in the detector: a hazard may nevertheless arise during maintenance operations in case metallic tools are used and for people with cardiac pacemakers, other electrical medical devices, or metallic implants.

3.19.2.2 Mitigations

Whenever any work has to be done on the Hodoscope, whether it will be opened or not, HV and LV cables are disconnected from the power supply and the power supply locked and tagged.

Junctions for the LED light are: LED to optical fiber (SMA connector), optical fiber into splitter box, splitter box to 11 output optical fibers, fibers to SiPM, and fibers illuminating the inside of the hodoscope. All of these junctions are completely sealed and light-tight. The fiber must not be disconnected from the LED source while the LED is operating. The splitter box or the hodoscope enclosure must not be opened while the LED is operating. The fibers should never be disconnected from the SiPMs while the LED is operating.

The Light Monitoring System must not be turned on or left on when the electronics enclosure or plastic scintillator enclosure are opened. The LED should not be looked at directly - eye protection must be worn. Warning labels are applied to the LED enclosure and plastic scintillator enclosure. During maintenance work, performed by trained personnel, the Light Monitoring System will be disconnected from power and locked and tagged.

A magnetic field hazard for personnel and equipment may arise if maintenance operations are performed while magnets are energized. Mitigation: the detector area is not accessible during regular CLAS12 operation; accessing the detector area implies the displacement of other CLAS12 subsystem that require the magnet to be turned off. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons.

3.19.2.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the FT-Hodo system are:

Name	Dept.	phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-1848		1st contact
N. Zacariou	Edinburgh		garys@jlab.org	contact
D. Watts	Edinburgh		dwatts1@ph.ed.ac.uk	2nd contact
D. Sokhan	Glasgow		daria@jlab.org	3rd contact

Table 3.18: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 FT-Hodo subsystem.

3.19.3 Forward Tagger Tracker

The Forward Tagger Tracker is composed of two double-sided Micromegas double-stage gaseous detectors. The system is located in the proximity of magnets, in an area where the fringe field is of the order of a few hundred gauss. The detectors are based on the resistive Micromegas technology that is also employed in the CLAS12 Central Micromegas tracker. Each detector consists of two planes with strips oriented along the X and Y axes, respectively, separated by 10 mm. Each plane has 768 strips with 560 μm pitch. The FT tracker covers the polar angle region from 2.5° to 4.5° from the target. The gas that will be used is a mixture of 80% argon, 10% CF_4 , and 10% isobutane. Even though isobutane is a flammable gas, the amount of gas in use at any given time is well within the range of a class-0 gaseous device.

The FT-Tracker is powered by high voltages up to 2000 V. The current limit for all three HV is extremely low (< 1 mA). The detectors are read out through 1.5-m-long, low-capacitance flex cables by Front-End Units (FEU). These electronic cards contain the customized DREAM ASICs in order to sample the detector signal and a Flash-ADC to digitize it and send it to the network. The FEUs are placed inside customized crates, installed on the outer case of the FT calorimeter. They are powered through low voltage, and kept within the 40°C to 60°C temperature range using a simple set of fans and tubing.

All hazards and mitigation options for the FT tracker are the same as for the CLAS12 Central Micromegas tracker (FMT and BMT). Even though the shapes of the detectors vary, they are almost identical in principle.

3.19.4 Hazards

Hazards to personnel include the use of flammable gas, high voltage, and the low voltage that powers the readout electronics. Hazards to the detector include mechanical damage, gas leaks, and gas over-pressure. Hazards concerning the Front-End Units include: wrong LV settings that could damage the FEUs and absence of cooling or cooling failure that could overheat the cards. To account for the presence of fringe magnetic fields from the CLAS12 magnets in the system location, no ferric materials are employed in the detector: a hazard may nevertheless arise during maintenance operations in case metallic tools are used and for people with cardiac pacemakers, other electrical medical devices, or metallic implants.

3.19.5 Mitigations

Mitigation of risks associated with then FT-Trk operations are achieved in the following way:

- the limited amount of flammable gas (10% isobutane over the whole gas in the detector) makes this a class-0 gas system. Nevertheless, the supply and exhaust will be located outside Hall B, all flows monitored, and hardware interlocks are used to avoid leaks and over-pressure;
- the low voltage/current range represents a low level electrical hazard for personnel. Nevertheless, during maintenance the HV and LV will be powered-off, cables disconnected, and locks and tags supplied;
- Interlocks on the gas supply will mitigate possible leaks and over-pressure conditions;
- continuous LV monitoring in conjunction with hardware interlocks will reduce possible issues with wrong settings. FT-Trk temperature monitoring will provide a fast LV turn-off in case of cooling failures or over-temperature conditions.

3.19.5.1 Fire Hazards Mitigation (Equipment and Personnel)

Use of flammable gas: the FT tracker detectors use 10% isobutane, which is flammable. However the amount of isobutane in the system is very limited. The gas supply and exhaust are located outside Hall B. The total combustion energy is equivalent to less than 4 g of hydrogen, which makes it a class-0 gas system (class-1 starts at 600 g).

General fire hazards and procedures for dealing with these are covered by JLab emergency management procedures. The JLab Fire Protection Manager (Ed Douberly) can be contacted at Office: 269-6638, Cell: (540)-729-0095.

3.19.5.2 Electrical Hazards Mitigation (Personnel)

High Voltage: high voltages up to 2000 V are used routinely for the detectors. Mitigation: very low current limit (10 μ A) is set. All mechanical structures are properly grounded.

Low Voltage: In order to power up the front-end electronics, we use low voltage at 6 V with 15 A per crate. Mitigation: voltage is low enough not

to be a danger to personnel, per EHS 6230 Table-1 this is Class-1 hazard. All maintenance work will be done trained personal in Mode 0, de-energized PS, unplugged from the receptacle with positive control of the cord. All mechanical structures are properly grounded. All cables and connectors are certified for this rating.

3.19.5.3 Other Hazards Mitigation

Detectors: gas over-pressure, gas leaks, mechanical damage. Mitigation: gas control system with over-pressure and leak limit detection by flowmeter (limit = 0.4 l/hr). The FT tracker detectors can be dismantled and repaired in case of accidental damage to the drift electrode. Since they are tightly stacked, only one such electrode is exposed and at risk, the rest of the stack is protected by the first detector.

Electronics: wrong LV settings, absence of cooling or cooling failure. Mitigation: Slow Controls read-back of LV setting before turning on the front-end electronics. Cooling is also checked by the Slow Controls system, and is interlocked so that the electronics cannot be turned on when the cooling is off. Also, temperature sensors are present on the front-end cards and are directly interlocked so that if the temperature goes beyond a predefined threshold, the cards are shut-down automatically.

Magnetic field: a hazard for personnel and equipment may arise if maintenance operations are performed while magnets are energized. Mitigation: the detector area is not accessible during regular CLAS12 operation; accessing the detector area implies the displacement of other CLAS12 subsystems that require the magnet to be turned off. Energized magnets are noted by red flashing beacons.

3.19.5.4 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the FT-Trk system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 344-1848		1st contact
M. Defurne	Saclay	+33169083237	maxime.defurne@cea.fr	1st contact
F. Sabatie	Saclay	+33169083206	franck.sabatie@cea.fr	2nd contact

Table 3.19: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 FT-Trk subsystem.

3.20 Backward Angle Neutron Detector

The Backward Angle Neutron Detector (BAND) is placed at the top of the SVT cart upstream of the CLAS12 target. It consists of 116 scintillator bars, arranged in 18 rows and 5 layers. Four bars are missing in the bottom of the detector due to obstruction. The bars have a cross section of $7.2 \times 7.2 \text{ cm}^2$ and they are 164 and 202 cm long in the upper region of BAND. In the bottom region the bars are divided into two shorter bars 51 cm to have a hole for the beam line and target installation. All bars are read-out on both sides by PMTs (Hamamatsu R7724 and ET9214) giving a total of 232 active channels.

In front of the first active layer of BAND, a veto layer is installed with 24 bars read-out only on one side. Therefore, the total number of channels for BAND is 256. The PMTs are placed in the fringe field region of the solenoid, and due to this they are encased in a cylindrical shielding made up by a 2-mm-thick layer of mu-metal.

In order to operate the PMTs, high voltages (typically in the range of 1500 V) are provided by a multi-channel CAEN SYS4527 mainframe with 11 A15350 cards (24 channel each). The signal of each PMT is sent to a splitter. The splitter are UVA splitter previously used by other experiments at JLab. From the splitter one signal is sent to flash-ADCs (250 VXS, 16 channels/board, made and owned by JLab) while the other signal is sent to discriminators (16 channels/board). The discriminated time signal then goes to a TDC (CAEN VX1190A, 128 channels/board, 100 ps/channel resolution). The read-out system is installed left of BAND in beam direction. In total, the system consists of 16 flash-ADCs in one VXS crate, 16 discriminators and a TDC in a VME crate and 16 splitters. Furthermore, a signal distribution card for the flash-ADCs and trigger interface boards are installed in the crates.

3.20.1 Hazards

3.20.1.1 Electrical hazard

The electrical hazard to personnel can come from the high voltage which powers the PMTs, which need about 1500 V to function.

3.20.1.2 Magnetic field hazard

BAND is placed in the fringe field of the solenoid (50 - 100 gauss). A hazard may arise during maintenance operations in case metallic tools are used and for people with cardiac pacemakers, other electrical medical devices, or metallic implants.

3.20.2 Mitigations

3.20.2.1 Electrical hazard mitigations

The maximum current provided by the HV distribution boards is quite low (< 1 mA). All mechanical structures are properly grounded. The HV boards must not be accessed during operation; during maintenance work, performed by trained personnel, the HV is turned off, and the power supply is locked and tagged.

3.20.2.2 Magnetic field hazard mitigations

After all sort of maintenance work is done on BAND, the area must be inspected and all ferromagnetic tools must be removed, before the field of the solenoid is ramped up again. Also, before the field can be turned on the PMT housings and magnetic shields should be thoroughly inspected, to make sure that they are no loose parts.

3.20.3 Responsible personnel

Individuals responsible for the system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Expert on call		(757) 746-3395		1st contact
O. Hen	MIT		hen@mit.edu	Contact
L. Weinstein	ODU		weinstein@jlab.org	Second contact

Table 3.20: Personnel responsible for the Backward Angle Neutron Detector.

3.21 Superconducting Solenoid Magnet

The CLAS12 Solenoid magnet provides the magnetic field for the tracking of charged particles and suppression of low energy electron background. It

hosts several detector packages including the Central Vertex Tracker (SVT and MVT), the Central Time-of-Flight, and the Central Neutron Detector. They all are located in the 780-mm-diameter warm bore. The solenoid has four main coils and one shield coil. The solenoid produces a magnetic field of 5 T when powered at 2416 A. The magnet has an overall inductance of 5.89 H and stored energy of 17.2 MJ.

3.21.1 Hazards

The hazards of the Solenoid magnet include the following:

- Electrical hazard
- Cryogenic hazard
- Vacuum hazard
- Magnetic field
- Stored energy

3.21.2 Mitigations

3.21.2.1 Electrical Hazard

The power supply for the Solenoid operates with input voltages of 120 VAC and 480 VAC and is interlocked to a current limit of 2450 A. Maintenance and servicing of the power supply can only be conducted by “Qualified Electrical Workers”. Additional information can be found in the OSP for the Hall B Solenoid Magnet. During normal operation, connections at the power supply are made inside the cabinet that has interlocked doors. Insulated cables carrying current to the magnet are routed with cable trays with all exposed leads and terminations covered by non-conductive or expanded metal enclosures. During a fast dump or quench, high voltage spikes may be induced on current leads and voltage taps. The leads from the voltage tap wires connect to the control system wiring through current limiting resistors to reduce any current-voltage combination to within the class-1 Electrical Classification of the EHS&Q Manual.

3.21.2.2 Cryogenic Hazard

The liquid helium is used to keep the coils superconducting. The total volume of liquid helium and liquid nitrogen in Hall B is less than 900 liters and

130 liters, respectively. Proper insulation is installed on all piping accessible to personnel. In the event of a quench or loss of insulating vacuum event, relief valves on the helium and nitrogen circuits vent generated gas to the hall. In case of such an event, Hall B remains ODH-0. In case of a power outage, the hall ODH rating would go up to ODH-2 after five hours. Appropriate ODH signs are posted at all entrances to the hall and an oxygen monitoring system is installed in the hall and operational.

3.21.2.3 Vacuum Hazard

The purpose of the vacuum system is to provide 10^{-5} Torr or better thermal insulating vacuum to five superconducting coils and the solenoid service tower (SST). After liquid helium is introduced into the coils, a Loss of Vacuum (LOV) event with a full air inrush can lead to very high heat transfer to the helium circuit with a resulting phase change in the liquid helium and potential high pressure expulsion from the system. In the event of an LOV event, relief valves on the helium circuit vent generated gas to the hall.

3.21.2.4 Magnetic Field

When powered up to 2416 A, the Solenoid can generate up to 5 T field in the center of the magnet and up to 1 kG in the zones that extend beyond the magnet boundaries. The 5 G boundary restricting access by personnel with surgical implants and bioelectric devices, the 200 G crane boundary, and the 600 G whole body boundary were found and recorded during the commissioning of the magnet. These contours will be marked up and appropriate signage posted. Strong magnetic fields will attract loose ferromagnetic objects, possibly injuring body parts or striking fragile components. Prior to energizing the magnet, a sweep of the surrounding area will be performed for any loose magnetic objects. All personnel entering the 600 G area will also be trained to remove ferromagnetic objects from themselves. To prevent personnel with surgical implants and bioelectric devices from entering the 5 G boundary, lighted warning signs are placed at the doors of the hall when the Solenoid is energized, and flashing red beacons and personnel barricades are installed at the actual 5 G contour.

3.21.2.5 Stored Energy

At 2416 A, the total energy stored in the magnet is about 17.2 MJ. Upon sudden loss of hall electrical power or quench or LOV, the energy is dumped into a dump resistor.

3.21.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the Solenoid system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Engineering on call	Hall B	(757) 748-5048	–	1st contact
B. Miller	Hall B	x7867	miller@jlab.org	2nd contact
K. Bruhwel	Hall B	x5577	bruhwel@jlab.org	3rd contact

Table 3.21: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 Solenoid magnet system.

3.22 Superconducting Toroidal Magnet

The CLAS12 Torus magnet provides the magnetic field for the tracking of forward-going charged particles and hosts several detector packages, including the Drift Chambers and Forward Tagger. It consists of six coils housed in an aluminum case that is approximately $2 \times 4 \times 0.05 \text{ m}^3$. The six coils produce a peak magnetic field of 3.58 T when powered at 3770 A. The magnet has an overall inductance of 2.0 H, stored energy of 14.2 MJ, and is roughly 8 m in diameter. Each coil is conductively cooled by supercritical helium gas supplied at 4.6 K from cooling tubes located on the coil inner diameter.

3.22.1 Hazards

The hazards of the Torus magnet include the following:

- Electrical hazard
- Cryogenic hazard
- Vacuum hazard
- Magnetic field
- Stored energy

3.22.2 Mitigations

3.22.2.1 Electrical Hazard

The power supply for the Torus operates with input voltages of 120 VAC and 480 VAC and is interlocked to a current limit of 3800 A. Maintenance

and servicing of the power supply can only be conducted by “Qualified Electrical Workers”. Additional information can be found in the OSP for the Hall B Toroidal Magnet. During normal operation, connections at the power supply are made inside the cabinet that has interlocked doors. Insulated cables carrying current to the magnet are routed within cable trays with all exposed leads and terminations covered by non-conductive or expanded metal enclosures. During a fast dump or quench, high voltage spikes may be induced on current leads and voltage taps. The leads from the voltage tap wires connect to the control system wiring through current limiting resistors to reduce any current-voltage combination to within the class-1 Electrical Classification of the EHS&Q Manual.

3.22.2.2 Cryogenic Hazard

Nitrogen and helium are two types of cryogenics used to keep the coils superconducting. The total volume of liquid helium and liquid nitrogen in Hall B is less than 900 liters and 130 liters, respectively. Proper insulation is installed on all piping accessible to personnel. In the event of a quench or loss of insulating vacuum event, relief valves on the helium and nitrogen circuits vent generated gas to the hall. In case of such event, Hall B remains ODH-0. In case of a power outage, the hall ODH rating would go up to ODH-2 after five hours. Appropriate ODH signs are posted at all entrances to the hall and an oxygen monitoring system is installed in the hall and operational.

3.22.2.3 Vacuum Hazard

The purpose of the vacuum system is to provide 10^{-5} Torr or better thermal insulating vacuum to six superconducting coils and the torus service tower (TST). After liquid helium is introduced into the coils, a Loss of Vacuum (LOV) event with a full air inrush can lead to very high heat transfer to the helium and nitrogen circuits with a resulting phase change in the liquid helium and nitrogen and potential high pressure expulsion from the system. In the event of an LOV event, relief valves on the helium and nitrogen circuits vent generated gas to the hall.

3.22.2.4 Magnetic Field

When powered up to 3770 A, the Torus can generate up to 3.58 T field close to the cold hub and up to 600 G in the zones that extend somewhat beyond the magnet boundaries. The 5 G boundary restricting access by personnel with surgical implants and bioelectric devices, the 200 G crane

boundary, and the 600 G whole body boundary were found and recorded during the commissioning of the magnet. These contours will be marked up and appropriate signage posted. Strong magnetic fields will attract loose ferromagnetic objects, possibly injuring body parts or striking fragile components. Prior to energizing the magnet, a sweep of the surrounding area will be performed for any loose magnetic objects. All personnel entering the 600 G area will also be trained to remove ferromagnetic objects from themselves. To prevent personnel with surgical implants and bioelectric devices from entering the 5 G boundary, lighted warning signs are placed at the doors of the hall when the Torus is energized, and flashing red beacons and personnel barricades are installed at the actual 5 G contour.

3.22.2.5 Stored Energy

At 3770 A, the total energy stored in the magnet is about 14.2 MJ. Upon sudden loss of hall electrical power or quench or LOV, the energy is dumped into a dump resistor.

3.22.3 Responsible Personnel

Individuals responsible for the Torus system are:

Name	Dept.	Phone	email	Comments
Engineering on call	Hall B	(757)-748-5048	–	1st contact
B. Miller	Hall B	x7867	miller@jlab.org	2nd contact
K. Bruhwel	Hall B	x5577	bruhwel@jlab.org	3rd contact

Table 3.22: Personnel responsible for the CLAS12 Torus magnet system.

Bibliography

- [1] CEBAF Hot Check-Out db page (accessible from inside JLab only)
URL:<https://accweb.acc.jlab.org/hco/>
- [2] EPICS Documentation. URL: <http://www.epics.org/>. See also
<http://www.aps.anl.gov/asd/controls/epics/EpicsDocumentation/WWWPages/EpicsDoc.html>
- [3] JLab EHS&Q Manual. URL: <http://www.jlab.org/ehs/ehsmanual/>.
- [4] JLab/CEBAF Personnel Safety System (PSS) Manual. URL:
http://www.jlab.org/eng/ssg/user_info.html
- [5] Accelerator Operations Directive.
URL: http://www.jlab.org/ops_docs/online_document_files/ACC_online_files/accel_ops_directive.pdf (URL is available inside JLab site).

